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I. Introduction
On November 5, 2008, Russia issued a challenge to President-elect Barack
Obama.' While other world leaders sent messages of congratulations to Obama2
once it was clear that he had won the U.S. presidential election on November 4,
2008,3 Russian President Dmitry Medvedev was notably silent4 in his November
5, 20085 annual Address to the Federal Assembly of the Russian Federation (the
"Address"), 6 which is somewhat analogous to the State of the Union delivered
annually by the U.S. President. President Medvedev neither congratulated nor
addressed President-elect Obama directly, 7 even though this would have been an
I Ariel Cohen, Europe Anti-Missile Defense System: Standing Up to Russia's Threats, HERITAGE
FOUND. (Heritage Found., Washington, D.C.), Nov. 20, 2008, at 1, available at http://www.heritage.org/
ResearchlRussiaandEurasia/upload/wm_2139.pdf.
2 See Leaders Congratulate Sen. Obama on Election Victory, GERMANY INFO, Nov. 5, 2008, http://
www.germany.info/Vertretung/usa/en/--PR/PWash/2008/11/05-Obama-Congratulations-PR,
archiveCtx=2028290.html, (stating that on November 5, 2008, German leaders did not hesitate to imme-
diately send messages of congratulation to Senator Barack Obama on his victory and assured President-
elect Obama of Germany's support as he prepared to take office. Chancellor Angela Merkel called
Obama's victory "historic," while the German Federal President, Horst Kohler wrote: "Allow me to
congratulate you warmly, also on behalf of my fellow Germans, on being elected President of the United
States of America .... Here you can count on Germany as a reliable partner and old friend."). See also
Sarkozy, Other French Leaders Congratulate Obama, EARTH TIMES, Nov. 5, 2008, http://www.earth
times.org/articles/show/240161,sarkozy-other-french-leaders-congratulate-obama-summary.html (stat-
ing that on Wednesday November 5, 2008, French President Nicolas Sarkozy sent President-elect Obama
a congratulatory letter. Sarkozy referred to Obama's victory as "brilliant," and after extending the
"warmest congratulations" on behalf of the French people, he wrote that Obama's election "'crowns an
exceptional campaign ... (that) has shown the vitality of American democracy to the entire world' ....
'In choosing you, the American people have chosen change, openness, and optimism.' Obama's victory
... Iraises a great hope in France, in Europe and in the world-that an open, united, and strong America
... will show a new way, with its partners, by the strength of its example and the adherence to its
principles.").
3 Adam Nagourney, Obama Wins Election; McCain Loses as Bush Legacy is Rejected, N.Y. TIMES,
Nov. 5, 2008, http://www.nytimes.com/2008/l1/05/us/politics/05campaign.html.
4 See President Dmitry Medvedev, Address to the Federal Assembly of the Russian Federation,
(Nov. 5, 2008), in PRESIDENT OF RussIA OFticiAL WEB PORTAL, available at http://www.kremlin.ru/
eng/text/speeches/2008/1 1/05/2144_type70029type829 17type 127286_208836.shtml [hereinafter
Medvedev Address]. In contrast, Russian President Vladimir Putin was one of the first leaders to express
solidarity with the U.S. following the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001. See Vladimir Putin, State-
ment on the Terrorist Acts in the U.S. (Sept. 12, 2001), available at http://www.invest2russia.com
usrus.html.
5 Medvedev Address, supra note 4; see C.J. Chivers, Medvedev Takes Oath in Russia, but Putin
Dominates Much of Day, N.Y. TIMES, May 8, 2008, at A16 (discussing the election and inauguration of
Dmitry Medvedev as the third President of the Russian Federation) [hereinafter Chivers, Medvedev Takes
Oath]. Medvedev won the Russian presidential election on March 2, 2008 and was inaugurated on May
7, 2008. He succeeds Vladimir Putin who held the office from 2000 to 2008.
6 Medvedev Address, supra note 4.
7 See id.
It's no secret that many states, simply due to inertia, look at which way the wind is blowing in
relations between Russia and the United States. Yes, today these relations are not the best. And
many questions are being raised in Russia, including moral ones. But I would stress that we
have no issue with the American people, we do not have inherent anti-Americanism. And we
hope that our partners, the new administration of the United States of America, will make a
choice in favour of full-fledged relations with Russia.
Id.; see also Anatoly Medetsky, Medvedev Signs Pledge on Tariffs in U.S., ST. PETERSBURG TImES, Nov.
18, 2008, at 1 (reporting that when asked later in November 2008 why he did not mention President-elect
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ideal opportunity to do so. 8 Instead, Medvedev threatened to respond to the
United States by "deploy[ing] the Iskander missile system in the Kaliningrad
Region," 9 "if Washington proceed[s] with its planned missile defense system in
Eastern Europe,"10 even though Medvedev had previously planned to dismantle
those systems."I President Medvedev also demonstrated a level of assertiveness,
which was highly uncharacteristic of him.' 2 Specifically, he recommended that
the Russian presidential term be extended from four years to six,' 3 and further, he
questioned the consolidation of power that was the trademark of his predeces-
sor,14 Vladimir Putin.15
Obama on November 5, 2008, President Medvedev said that he had simply forgotten about the U.S.
election).
8 See Medvedev Address, supra note 4. Instead, President Medvedev discussed at great length,
Russian policy, the Russian Constitution, and various domestic concerns Russia faces, including health
care, education, and developing [a] judicial system. Id. Medvedev also addressed several international
issues facing Russia, such as the 2008 Georgian-Russian Conflict and the ongoing international financial
crisis. Id.
9 Medvedev Address, supra note 4.
10 Ellen Barry & Sophia Kishkovsky, Russia Warns of Missile Deployment, N.Y. Timss, Nov. 5,
2008, http://www.nytimes.com/2008/1l/06/world/europe/O6iht-O6russia.17572437.html. See also Co-
hen, supra note 1, at 1-2:
Moscow fiercely opposes the American missile defense system, claiming that the project
compromises its national security. Yet Russia's claims fail any objective test: the top Kremlin
ballistic missile experts have written that the missile shield in Europe cannot neutralize Russia's
overwhelming nuclear arsenal-not even Moscow's second-strike capability ....
... In addition, the U.S. has done much to reassure Moscow that the system is intended only
to counter possible strikes from rogue states in the Middle East such as Iran ....
... Russia's threat is indeed a shrewd geopolitical move. By opposing Washington, Moscow
is trying to drive a wedge between "old" and "new" Europe, and between Europe and the U.S.
Id.
" See Medvedev Address, supra note 4.
12 See id. (during his November 5, 2008 Address, Medvedev did not once refer to Prime Minister
Putin, but instead, set out his own agenda: "I feel it necessary to set out my vision of the fundamental
laws . . . . As the guarantor of the Constitution, I will preserve and protect these fundamental
provisions.").
13 See id. ("we should increase the constitutional mandates of the President and State Duma to six
and five years respectively.").
14 See id.
[T]he maturity of the democratic institutions and procedures that [the Russian Constitution] guar-
antees are the source for our continued development. Now, as we come to a new age in our
development, we are setting new goals that call for greater participation by our citizens, political
parties and other public institutions....
... But an all-powerful bureaucracy is a mortal danger for civil society. This is why our
society must continue calm and steady work to build up its democratic institutions and not delay
this work.
Id.
15 Putin Becomes Russian PM in Leadership "Tandem," CHINA DAILY, May 9, 2008, http://
www.chinadaily.com.cn/world/2008-05/09/content_6672476.htm. Vladimir Putin served two terms as
Russia's President, from 2000 to May 2008. President Medvedev quickly nominated Putin to be Prime
Minister, the position Putin currently holds. Id.
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Interestingly, until this point, the newly elected Medvedev had demonstrated
an unwavering willingness to work with Prime Minister Putin in "tandem,"' 16 by
indicating that the Prime Minister would continue to serve an important role.
Medvedev also said that their "cooperation will only continue to strengthen,"
implying that this special relationship would continue for some time, if not indef-
initely.17 This posture was particularly newsworthy because the prime minister
position is regarded as second to the president, much like the U.S. Vice President
to the U.S. President. Moreover, never before has a Russian Head of State con-
ceded or opted to share his power so willingly. However, on November 5, 2008,
President Medvedev demonstrated that he alone spoke for Russia and even criti-
cized positions that his prime minister had taken while serving as president.
Soon thereafter, in a diplomatic gesture, the Kremlin announced that
Medvedev had sent President-elect Obama a congratulatory telegram.1 8 But the
message had already been sent to Washington, and it was clear - the Kremlin
sought to provide President-elect Obama with his first foreign policy test and it
wanted Washington to know that President Medvedev was serious. 19
Undoubtedly, Americans have become increasingly concerned with Russia's
re-emergence on the world stage. Many believe that former President and cur-
rent Prime Minister Vladimir Putin "has ransacked the hopes the world once had
for post-Soviet Russian democracy. He is reviving Russian authoritarianism, and
the world's democracies need to prepare for its consequences. ' 20 American lead-
ers have even emphatically declared that looking into Putin's eyes reveals three
letters: K-G-B, 21 suggestive that Russia has already begun to roll back progress
at the behest of Putin, a former Soviet spy. 22 Clearly, times have changed since
16 Id. (Medvedev stating that Putin would serve a "key role" alongside him).
17 Vidya Ram, Medvedev Needn't Be Putin's Puppet, FORBES.COM, May 8, 2008, http://www.forbes.
com/2008/05/08/medvedev-putin-russia-face-cxyvr0508autofacescan0l.html.
18 Russia's Medvedev Congratulates U.S. President-Elect Obama, RussIAN NEWS & INFO. AGENCY,
Nov. 5, 2008, http://en.rian.ru/world/20081105/1l8142101.html (reporting that in a telegram to Presi-
dent-elect Obama on November 5, 2008, President Medvedev said, "I hope for constructive dialogue with
you based on trust and considering each other's interests").
19 Getting Medvedev's Message; Russia, ECONOMIST, Nov. 8, 2008 (stating that "this is the first time
since the cold war that Russia has declared its intention to create a military threat to the West.").
20 Putin the Great, WALL ST. J., Oct. 3, 2007, at A 18; see Masha Gessen, Dead Soul, VANrrY FAIR,
Oct. 2008, at 336 (LEXIS)
In May of this year, with much fanfare, Putin handed over his post as president of the Rus-
sian Federation to a handpicked successor, Dmitry Medvedev, and installed himself as prime
minister.... But Russians continue to inhabit a country which is Putin's creation and in which
his authority is supreme, and they will be living in Putin's Russia for a long time to come.
Id.
21 Jackie Calmes, McCain Sees Something Else in Putin's Eyes, WALL ST. J., Oct. 16, 2007, http://
blogs.wsj.comlwashwire/2007/m10/6/mccain-sees-something-in-putins-eyes/tab/article/ (McCain told the
Republican Jewish Coalition, "'I looked into Mr. Putin's eyes and I saw three things-a K and a G and a
B."' Secretary of State Colin Powell stated something similar when he said, "'I looked into President
Putin's eyes and I saw the KGB."'). K.G.B. is the Russian abbreviation for Committee for State Secur-
ity, which was the Soviet Union's premier intelligence agency, and counterpart to the U.S. Central Intelli-
gence Agency ("C.I.A.").
22 See Gessen, supra note 20 (stating that Putin once told reporters, "'I was most amazed by the way
that a single person could accomplish something entire armies couldn't'. .. . 'A lone agent could rule the
lives of thousands of people."'). Ten years later, when the K.G.B. colonel suddenly got a chance to
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President George W. Bush once described looking into then-President Putin's
eyes and stated that he could see into Putin's soul.
23
Medvedev's November 5, 2008 challenge serves several important functions
in this regard. First, it shows that even with Putin out of office, Russian leaders
plan to make their presence known. Second, it highlights Russia's newfound
significance following many years of appearing irrelevant and unimportant. In-
deed, Russia was perceived as having "fallen off of the radar" after the fall of the
Soviet Empire. Finally, Medvedev's challenge underscores the urgency with
which American leaders must respond (or organize an American position and
plan), since it is abundantly clear that Russia is now relevant and very much
"back on the radar."
Understandably, Americans may now regard Russia with apprehension, if not
fear.24 After all, it is still unclear what role Russia played in instigating or carry-
ing out the August 2008 Georgian conflict.25 And if Russia played a part, which
is likely, does this necessarily mean that Russia also plans to pursue a more
aggressive foreign policy course?26 Equally disconcerting is that aside from
Medvedev's November 5, 2008 challenge, Prime Minister Putin seems to retain a
significant amount of power, despite the fact that he is no longer the president.
27
Compounding concerns, President Medvedev recently announced that Russia
would begin a "large-scale rearming" by 2011, in response to alleged national
security threats.28
reshape his country, Putin remade it in the likeness of what he had known and loved best: a rigidly
hierarchical, and tightly controlled system. Id.
23 See Press Conference, President Bush and Russian Federation President Putin (June 16, 2001),
available at http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2001/06/20010618.html ("I
looked the man in the eye. I found him to be very straightforward and trustworthy. We had a very good
dialogue. I was able to get a sense of his soul ....").
24 See Getting Medvedev's Message; Russia, supra note 19 (stating that President Medvedev's re-
sponse to the financial crisis has been to become more anti-American).
25 See Elise Labott, U.S. May Seek to Punish Russia for Georgia Conflict, CNN.coM, Aug. 12, 2008,
http://www.cnn.com/2008/WORLD/europe/08/12/georgia.us/index.html.
26 See Gessen, supra note 20 ("A new war with Georgia signals a return to an era when an aggres-
sive, expansionist Russia threatened all its neighbors."); see also Getting Medvedev's Message; Russia,
supra note 19 (stating that Russia would not back down and in "response to the expansion of NATO and
the construction of missile defenses in Poland and the Czech Republic," Russia would place missiles in
Kaliningrad as a military threat to the West).
27 Under the Russian Constitution, the President is, "the head of State .... [who] shall be the
guarantor of the Constitution ...." and "represent the Russian Federation within the country and in
international relations." Konstitutsiia Rossiiskoi Federatsii [Konst. RF] [Constitution] art. 80, available
at http://www.constitution.ru/en/10003000-05.htm. Specifically, "The President ... shall[ ] govern the
foreign policy of the Russian Federation . . And] shall be the Supreme Commander-in-Chief of the
Armed Forces ..... Id. arts. 86-87. The Russian President can also issue normative decrees. Id. art. 90.
By contrast, the Prime Minister is "appointed by the President of the Russian Federation ... " suggesting
that because he derives his power from the President, he is necessarily subordinate. Id. art. I 11. Simi-
larly, it is illustrative that he shares the Governmental Branch of the Russian Federation with deputy
chairmen and federal ministers. Id. art. 110. Finally, most of the Prime Minister's duties relate to
domestic concerns, including ensuring "implementation ...of a single State policy in the sphere of
culture, science, education, health protection, social security, and ecology ...." Id. art. 114. Certainly,
the language of the Russian Constitution indicates that the President possesses superior power and au-
thority, compared to those powers held by the Prime Minister.
28 Clifford J. Levy, Medvedev to Bolster Military in Russia, N.Y. TtMEs, Mar. 18, 2009, at A9.
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However, Russia's recent behavior does not necessarily imply the rise of a
burgeoning threat to the United States. Instead, as Medvedev recently said, Rus-
sian-American relations are merely going through a "crisis of trust."'29 That he
directly acknowledged the existing tensions suggests that Medvedev recognizes
the tense situation and the fact that Americans may be growing wary of their
supposed ally. The statement also suggests that Medvedev seeks to re-establish
America's trust, meaning that he would like to be on good terms with the United
States.
This Article argues that now more than ever the United States must adopt a
more nuanced approach to Russia. The U.S. must recognize Russia's inherent
distinctiveness and unique perspective of the world. Geographic distances illus-
trate this point. Although Washington D.C. and Moscow are separated by
4,887.40 miles, Moscow is also 4,159.60 miles from the Russian city of Yuzhno-
Sukhalinsk. Accordingly, even though Russia and the U.S. are separated by
thousands of miles, Russia's size also means that thousands of miles separate its
various cities, illustrative of Russia's complexity and diversity. As such, ap-
proaching Russia from an American-centric perspective that fails to acknowledge
how inherently distinctive Russia is would be misguided at best -misplaced at
worst. 30
This Article focuses on one area where the traditional American-centric per-
spective has distorted Russian reality - the U.S. failure to appreciate Russia's
distinctive vision of the rule of law and democracy. This Article argues that
future U.S. policies must recognize Russia's unique worldview. Specifically,
Russia's multi-faceted and storied history, and intensely fervent nationalism have
formed a unique worldview that provides the lens through which to view Rus-
sia's understanding of the rule of law and democracy. It is through this lens that
the Russia of today may be reconciled, because although Russian leaders' recent
actions may not necessarily comport with an American or western-style rule of
law or democracy, such actions do not mean that Russia has abandoned the de-
velopment of the rule of law or democracy entirely. Rather, this Article contends
that Russia is developing a Russian vision of the rule of law and Russian style of
democracy that comport with its uniquely Russian worldview.
Part II explores Russia's unique vision of the law. It shows that Russia has
historically had a weak legal culture, which necessarily hindered the develop-
ment of a full-scale western vision of "the rule of law." Part II contends that this
historical weakness is actually a strength. Russia's traditional aversion to law
has nurtured the development of a distinctly Russian vision of the rule of law.
Although this vision of the law may not have all the characteristics or elements
emblematic of a western rule of law, several of its features demonstrate that Rus-
sia is steadily moving towards a more stable rule of law that is supported and
entrusted by the Russian people.
29 Medetsky, supra note 7.
30 See Doug Struck, Gorbachev Applauds Putin's Achievements; Ex-Leader Cites Russian "Resur-
gence", WASH. POST, Dec. 5, 2007, at A22 (Mikhail Gorbachev has indicated that "Russia will not be
and doesn't want to be a junior partner, a kid brother, that is doing the West's bidding," thereby sug-
gesting that Russia is inherently different and separate from the West).
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Part III explores the Russian tradition of having a strong state that has, in turn,
seemingly de-emphasized the importance of democracy. Thus, the concern that
Russia has suddenly abandoned democracy may be reconciled by examining
Russia's tradition of strong leaders, as well as its recent experimentation with
western-style democracy. Specifically, Russia's unique understanding of the
state has promoted the development of a democracy that seeks to balance both a
strong state ideal and more modern democratic values. Accordingly, even
though this emerging Russian-style democracy differs from those democracies of
western nations, most notably, the United States, it illustrates that Russia is de-
veloping a democracy that is consistent with its own heritage, values, and
sensibilities.
Ultimately, this Article concludes that the U.S. concern that Russian leader-
ship has constructively "hijacked" Russia is misplaced. Rather, the new Ameri-
can administration must acknowledge that Russian leaders' behavior and actions
are actually promising because they indicate the genuine development of a rule of
law and democracy, albeit the development of distinctly Russian "hybrid"
version.
II. Russia's Vision of the Rule of Law: The Product of a Unique Legal
Experience and History
"'The worst legacy we have from the Stalin era is the way we think. And we
cannot obtain new thinking on credit.' 31
On January 22, 2008,32 and then again on November 5, 2008, 33 Dmitry
Medvedev spoke to the Russian people about the legal nihilism34 that pervades
their country and how it remains a fundamental obstacle to Russia's progress.
But before this, President Putin called for "cementing the rule of law in Rus-
sia," 35 suggesting that this issue is neither a new development, nor a modern
31 GORDON B. SMITH, REFORMING THE RUSSIAN LEGAL SYSTEM 191 (Cambridge Univ. Press 1996)
(quoting Oazug Nantoy) [hereinafter SMITH, REFORMING].
32 Richard Sakwa, Dmitry Medvedev's Challenge, OPENDEMOCRACY.NET, May 7, 2008, http://
www.opendemocracy.net/article/govemrnents/dmitri-medvedev-s-challenge.
33 See Medvedev Address, supra note 4 ("I note that legal nihilism is not a new phenomenon in
Russia but is something that has its roots deep in our distant past. Fifteen years is too short a time to
eradicate such deeply-rooted traditions.").
34 Sakwa, supra note 32 (reporting that Medvedev emphasized respect for, and supremacy of the
law); see also President Dmitry Medvedev, Speech at the V Krasnoyarsk Economic Forum (Feb. 15,
2008), available at http://www.medvedev2008.ru/english_2008-02-15.htm ("I have spoken many times
about the sources of a legal nihilism in our country that remains a distinguishing feature of our society.");
see also WILLIAM BURNHAM ET AL., LAW AND LEGAL SYSTEM OF THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION 6 (3d ed.
2004) (Herzen described 19th Century 'legal nihilism' as "continu[ing] to undermine efforts to install
legality as a principle on which both society and the state should be based."); see also EUR. PARL. Ass.
DEB. 27th Sess. 1065 (Sept. 26, 1995) (the Council of Europe has emphasized that one of Russia's major
tasks is to develop a legal culture or a "broad awareness of, and respect for, the rule of law.., in all its
aspects: political, legal and administrative - and at all levels: national, regional and local.").
35 Steven Lee Myers, What Chance Justice Is Done? Russia's System Is Questioned, N.Y. TIMES,
Nov. 1, 2003, at Al; Jeffrey Kahn, Vladimir Putin and the Rule of Law in Russia, 36 GA. J. INT'L &
COMP. L. 511, 555 (2008) (stating that generally, the 'rule of law' relates to the concept that the govern-
ment should remain subordinate to the law) [hereinafter Kahn, Vladimir Putin]; see Jeffrey Kahn, The
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concern. Russians have historically entertained a "negative myth" 36 of the rule
of law,3 7 as evidenced by the numerous Russian folk sayings and proverbs that
express discontent with the law and the Russian legal system.38 This skepticism
still resonates more than one hundred years after many of these phrases and prov-
erbs first entered the Russian vernacular, 39 illustrating that Russia remains "a
country currently in search of a national identity." 40
Certainly, Russia is not distinctive in its struggle towards developing a
stronger rule of law, which Mikhail Gorbachev referred to as pravovoe
gosudarstvo-"law governed state."' 41 However,
What makes Russia different from most other countries is historical con-
text. When courts in most other countries reach results that seem to be
dictated more by the preferences of the powerful than by the law, observ-
Search for the Rule of Law in Russia, 37 GEO. J. Ir'L L. 353, 360, 363 (2006) [hereinafter Kahn, The
Search]
[T]he rule of law requires some level of shared expectations by political elites, lawyers, and
laypersons about what counts as law, about what are the limits of judicial power, and about into
what spheres of life the law may not be permitted to intrude....
.... Nearly all scholars agree that the rule of law means the supremacy of law over govern-
ment, or put another way, government under law.
Id.; A.V. DICEY, INTRODUCTION TO THE STUDY OF THE LAW OF THE CONsTrruION 188-203 (E.C.S.
Wade ed., London, MacMillan 1961) (1885) (explaining that the rule of law encompasses the belief that
the law should be clear, predictable, and general in its application); see James L. Gibson, Russian Atti-
tudes Towards the Rule of Law: An Analysis of Survey Data, in LAW AND INFORMAL PRACTICES: THE
POST-COMMUNIST EXPERIENCE 77, 78-79 (Denis J. Galligan & Marina Kurkchiyan eds., Oxford Univ.
Press 2003); see Vasily A. Vlasihin, Towards a Bill of Rights for Russia: Progress and Roadblocks, 17
NOVA L. REV. 1201 (1993); see SMITH, REFORMING, supra note 31, at 14 (noting that the impetus for the
"Golden Age of Russian Law" came from two sources, mainly: "the necessity for new laws to facilitate
expanding contacts with other European empires, and lobbying by a Western-educated intelligentsia that
viewed adherence to the rule of law as an essential characteristic of civilized European States"). Interest-
ingly, the "backlash" against these new ideas represented a desire "to preserve the uniqueness of Russian
society." Id.
36 MARINA KURKCHIYAN, The Illegitimacy of Law in Post-Soviet Societies, in LAW AND INFORMAL
PRACTICES: THE POST-COMMUNIST EXPERIENCE 25, 30 (Oxford Univ. Press 2003).
37 See Kathryn Hendley, Assessing the Rule of Law in Russia, 14 CARDOZO J. INT'L & COMP. L. 347,
351 (2006) (stating that the "Law has had a checkered history in Russia. By almost any definition the
'rule of law' has been mostly absent.").
38 See Michael Newcity, Why Is There No Russian Atticus Finch? Or Even a Russian Rumpole?, 12
TEX. WESLEYAN L. REV. 271, 271 n.1 (2005) (examples include, "Stand up to God with truth, and to the
judge with money," and "He went to Court with his coat and came out stark naked.") [hereinafter New-
city, Why Is There No Russian Atticus Finch].
39 Id. at 273 (stating that "[t]he attitudes expressed in the Russian folk saying quoted at the beginning
of this paper have not changed and in the nearly ninety years that have passed since the Bolshevik
Revolution little has happened to improve those attitudes.").
40 Frances H. Foster, Izvestiia as a Mirror of Russian Legal Reform: Press, Law, and Crisis in the
Post-Soviet Era, 26 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 675, 745 (1993).
41 Hiroshi Oda, The Emergence ofPravovoe Gosudarstvo, 25 REV. CENT. & E. EUR. L. 373, 374; see
Adi Ignatius, A Tsar Is Born, TIME, Dec. 31, 2007, at 46 (LEXIS) [hereinafter Ignatius, A Tsar Is Born];
see Hendley, supra note 37; see generally Kahn, The Search, supra note 35 (explaining that although
some legal reform occurred in Russia under Mikhail Gorbachev, corruption and a continued distrust of
the law made efforts to develop the rule of law difficult).
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ers tend to dismiss such cases as outliers. For Russians, however, such
cases bring back painful memories .... 42
Therefore, such myths that portray Russian law negatively are reinforced. Fur-
thermore, the rule of law in Russia has historically taken a paternalistic tone,
which has effectively prevented or obstructed the development of an indepen-
dently thinking populace. 43
It is encouraging that Russia's developing rule of law appears to be shedding
the paternalistic overtones of its past. However, Russians remain deeply skepti-
cal of the rule of law, suggesting that any genuine development and progress will
necessarily be gradual and uniquely Russian. Russians have been socialized "to
expect little of the legal system to the extent that when they have a positive
experience, they seek to rationalize it."'44 Thus, the development of the rule of
law in Russia must be understood within "the rich context of [Russian] cul-
ture,' '45 both past and present.
A. Russia's Historical and Cultural Antipathy Toward Law
Russia and its legal traditions were Christianized and influenced by the Byzan-
tine tradition, which emphasized different values than those espoused by the Ro-
man Catholic Church, which shaped Western Europe.4 6 Broadly, Roman culture
emphasized "notions of mutual obligation and contract, '47 and "drawing . .. lines
between the different, competing legal systems, ' 48 so that Western European cul-
ture developed these values and the understanding that "performing one's agree-
ments was a matter of honor regardless of the subject matter of the agreement. 49
Within this context arose "competing legal jurisdictions and a highly rational,
scholastic, textual orientation to religion .... -50
Perhaps the most distinctive characteristic of the development of Western
legal tradition was the coexistence and competition within the same com-
munity of diverse jurisdictions and diverse legal systems. It was and is
42 Hendley, supra, note 37, at 351.
43 See Mikhail Krasnov, The Rule of Law, in BETWEEN DICTATORSHIP AND DEMOCRACY 195, 212
(Michael McFaul et al. eds., Carnegie Endowment for Int'l Peace 2004).
The power of a law-governed state lies not in its institutional content, but in its ability to
transform the philosophy of public life. The basis of this philosophy is trust in the individual and
individual's independence. The actual practice of power, including its methodology of reforms,
ought to foster freedom, not paternalism.
Id.
44 Hendley, supra note 37, at 371.
45 KURKCHIYAN, supra note 36, at 25-42.
46 ORLANDO FIGES, NATASHA'S DANCE: A CULTURAL HISTORY OF RUSSIA 293-300 (Metropolitan
Books 2002).
47 Newcity, Why Is There No Russian Atticus Finch, supra note 38, at 295.
48 Michael Newcity, Russian Legal Tradition and the Rule of Law, in THE RULE OF LAW AND EcO-
NOMIC REFORM IN RUSSIA 41, 48 (Jeffrey D. Sachs & Katharina Pistor eds., Westview Press 1997).
49 Newcity, Why Is There No Russian Atticus Finch, supra note 38, at 294.
50 Id. at 298; see John Meyendorff, The Church, in AN INTRODUCTION To RUSSIAN HISTORY 315, 316
(Robert Auty & Dimitri Obolensky eds., Cambridge Univ. Press 1976).
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this plurality of jurisdictions and legal systems that makes the supremacy
of the law both necessary and possible. 5'
This logical and rational value system and framework for the rule of law, how-
ever, did not develop in Russia.
The Russian Orthodox Church shaped Russia very differently. As "the cen-
tral, binding force in Russian culture for thousands of years,"'52 the Russian Or-
thodox Church emphasized "the mystical and subjective, rather than the
objective, formalistic, and rationalistic. '53 Further, instead of accentuating "in-
tellectuality and philosophizing," like the Roman Church, the Russian Orthodox
Church accentuated "[t]he beauty of church architecture, painted icons, music,
and the liturgy . . . . -54 Moreover, the Russian Orthodox Church emphasized
"the personal 'religious experience,' the mystical versus the intellectual experi-
ence," and for centuries, even fostered the development of a theocracy where
church and state were one, unlike the Roman Church's "legalistic view of the
world," 55 where the spiritual and secular were entirely separate. 56
Whereas a strong separation between the church and state and the existence of
various competing jurisdictions developed in the West, this was not true for Rus-
sia. Russia did not develop a belief in the supremacy of the law or a belief in the
supremacy of the rational or logical:
[T]here can be no doubt that the development of the Russian legal tradi-
tion followed a different trajectory from that of the Western legal tradi-
tion, that these differences account for profoundly different attitudes
toward the law and legal institutions in Russian culture, and that these
differences are attributable primarily to the influence of the Russian Or-
thodox Church. 57
51 Harold J. Berman, LAW AND REVOLUTION: THE FORMATION OF THE WESTERN LEGAL TRADITION
10 (Harvard Univ. Press 1983).
52 Newcity, Why Is There No Russian Atticus Finch, supra note 38, at 292-93.
Traditionally, in order to be considered Russian, an individual had to be Orthodox and it appears
that this traditional view has experienced a resurgence in post-communist Russia. Just as Cathol-
icism and its Protestant offshoots have been extremely important in shaping the Western legal
tradition, the Orthodox Church, its doctrine, even its liturgy have been central in the formation of
a distinctive Russian legal tradition, which, in turn has colored popular perceptions of legal
institutions, law, and its practitioners.
Id. (citations omitted).
53 Id. at 293 (citing FIOES, supra note 46, at 293-300).
54 Id. (citing Dmitry S. Likhachev, Religion: Russian Orthodoxy, in THE CAMBRIDGE COMPANION TO
MODERN RUSSIAN CULTURE 41 (Nicholas Rzhevsky ed., Cambridge Univ. Press 1998).
55 Newcity, Why Is There No Russian Atticus Finch, supra note 38, 293, 296; see SMrnI, REFORMING,
supra note 31, at 2-7.
56 See Newcity, Why Is There No Russian Atticus Finch, supra note 38, at 297.
In Western Europe, the church's efforts to establish itself as an entity with authority and jurisdic-
tion separate from secular authority sparked revival of interest in Roman law and stimulated the
development of canon law and legalistic methods of analysis. During the law Middle Ages, the
universities at Bologna and Paris were especially noted for their study of Roman and canon law.
In Russia however, no comparable church-sponsored scholarly movement occurred.
Id.
57 Id. at 295.
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B. The Law As Inadequate
Moreover, Russians have historically never respected or much admired the
law.5 8 The law "does not symbolize morality, honesty, and justice. Rather, it is
seen as a tactical game requiring expertise in manoeuvre, influence, and persua-
siveness. '' 59 In this same way, legal institutions have traditionally been perceived
as inadequate,60 and legal officers have never garnered the level of respect or
"standing" that their counterparts have received in places like the United States
or England. 61 For example, although American judges are perceived as the pil-
lars of western society, Russian judges are viewed at as merely "bureaucrats. '62
Simply, the law does not represent a moral truth for the Russian conscious-
ness. 63 Instead, it is perceived as rational, formalistic, political, and "the exclu-
sive instrument of the government," 64 to be wielded as a "weapon of the state." 65
"[P]olitics [is] little more than a corrupt form of warfare waged between equally
unappealing clans."' 66 As such, because "the Russian state has maintained a pa-
ternalistic relationship with its citizens .... the spirit of a law-governed state has
never existed in Russia, and the idea of obedience to the law is still not particu-
larly popular. '67
As the Russian proverbs say, "Stand up to God with truth, and to the judge
with money," and "He went to Court with his coat on and came out stark na-
ked."'68 Even "[t]oday, this belief resonates strongly in the minds of Russians
who largely believe the legal system is unable to resolve their problems in a just
58 See Vlasihin, supra note 35, at 1202, 1208 (1993); see W. BRUCE LINCOLN, BETWEEN HEAVEN
AND HELL: THE STORY OF A THOUSAND YEARS OF ARTISTIC LIFE I RUSSIA 58-59 (Penguin Group 1998)
(stating that emblematic of Russia's deep-seated sensibility is the story of the Russian Tsar Peter the
Great who "famously introduced Western ideas, and culture to Russia at the beginning of the eighteenth
century." Though, instead of receiving praise for seeking to westernize Russia, the Tsar was criticized for
"sacrificing traditional Russian values on behalf of specious Western ideals." Id. What may be gleaned
from this story is that Russians distinguish their own culture and values, from the West's conception of
the law; western indoctrination is regarded with suspicion.).
59 KURKCHIYAN, supra note 36, at 43.
60 Id. at 28-34.
61 Newcity, Why Is There No Russian Atticus Finch, supra note 38, at 280. "[O]ne Russian commen-
tator noted in 1909, 'Here 'judge' is not an honorable calling that attests to impartiality, selflessness, and
high service to the law alone, as it does among other peoples."' Id. See RICHARD S. WORTMAN, THE
DEVELOPMENT OF A RUSSIAN LEGAL CONSCIOUSNESS 288 (The Univ. of Chicago Press 1976) (stating that
Tolstoy and Dostoevsky "expressed a common distaste for members of the judicial profession as officials
cold and un-Russian in their rational adherence to legal science.").
62 Hendley supra, note 37, at 358.
63 ALEXANDER M. YAKOVLEV, STRIVING FOR LAW IN A LAWLESS LAND: MEMOIRS OF A RUSSIAN
REFORMER 10 (M.E. Sharpe 1996).
64 Jessica C. Wilson, Russia's Cultural Aversion to the Rule of Law, 2 Colum. J. E. Eur. L. 195, 197
(2008); Kurkchiyan, supra note 36, at 39-40.
65 Gordon B. Smith, Russia and the Rule of Law, in DEVELOPMENTS IN RUSSIAN POLITICS 5, at 108,
108 (Stephen White et al. eds., Duke Univ. Press 2001).
66 PETER BAKER & SUSAN GLASSER, KREMLIN RISING: VLADIMIR PuTIN's RussiA AND THE END OF
REvOLUTnON 381 (Scribner 2005).
67 Krasnov, supra note 43, at 201.
68 Newcity, Why Is There No Russian Atticus Finch, supra note 38, at 271 n. 1.
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manner. '69 Rather, the legal system is perceived as inefficient, arbitrary, and
hopeless. 70 Consequently, "many analysts contend that a natural legal nihilism is
manifest among Russia's citizens and that striving for a law-governed state is
hopeless."'' T
C. Justice, Not Law, as the Truth
Compared to the law, the concept of justice resonates deeply with Russians
because it can be reached through "internalization, thoughtfulness and collective
consciousness. '72 Justice is connected to the Russian moral and spiritual com-
pass and "is the concentrated expression of the Russian people's awareness of
natural law."' 73 As the popular saying illustrates: "Judge according to the law or
according to the conscience. '74
In the traditional Russian view, it is through justice that one can reach higher
and more valuable truths as well as God,7 5 suggesting that justice is more closely
aligned with the Russian Orthodox Church and all that it espouses. Indeed, for
Russians, justice symbolizes what man can achieve on his own, beyond the defi-
ciencies of government and imperfections of the law.
D. Western Imperialism Through the Law
Russians have also been critical of the law since it has often represented a
form of western imperialism. For example, the Judicial Reforms of 1864 intro-
duced many new legal elements to the Russian legal system, but these were con-
sidered "western-style" institutions. 76
The principal elements of the Judicial Reforms were the introduc-
tion of professional judges and lawyers; trial by jury in criminal cases;
opening judicial proceedings to the public; replacement of the old inquisi-
torial legal procedure that emphasized written documents and secrecy
with an adversarial system relying on oral testimony in public
proceedings. 77
Russian writers like Dostoevsky expressed great disdain for such legal reforms.
Dostoevsky said, "[t]he new legal system is being used by a class of liberal pro-
69 Wilson, supra note 64, at 196.
70 Id. at 198.
71 Krasnov, supra note 43, at 201.
72 Wilson, supra note 64, at 198.
73 Krasnov, supra note 43, at 202.
74 Id.
75 See YAKOVLEV, supra note 63, at 10 (stating that "[in Russian people's consciousness, the law has
never been associated with moral truth.").
76 See Newcity, Why Is There No Russian Atticus Finch, supra note 38, at 284.
77 Id. at 279 (citing David Keily, The Brothers Karamazov and the Fate of Russian Truth: Shifts in
the Construction and Interpretation of Narrative After Judicial Reform of 1864 (Sept. 24, 1996), 34
(unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Harvard University)).
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fessionals to destroy Russian civilization from within, to accomplish, in effect,
what every foreign invasion had failed to do." 78
E. The Twentieth Century: A Harsh Russian Legal Experience
Marxist thought also perpetuated a deep disdain for the law. Decree No. 1 on
the courts of the Bolshevik government, published in 1917, stated: "All laws
contrary to the decrees of the Central Executive Committee [of the Bolshevik
Party], the workers' and peasants' government .... or to the minimum program
of the Russian Social Democratic Workers' Party [i.e., the Bolshevik Party] and
the Socialist Revolutionary Party shall be considered abrogated. ' 79 The Marxist-
Leninist General Theory of the State and Law stated: "The idea that law, whether
understood as a supra-class norm of obligation, as an abstract, comprehensive
kind of justice, or as a natural right of man, rules over the state and over the
political authority, binding and limiting it, is by its nature a disguise for class
dictatorship. ' 80
Not surprisingly, Marxist thought viewed law as "the will of the ruling class,
expressed in statute. ' 81 Ultimately, "Marxists also believed that law would die
out under communism. Soviet theorists maintained that at the highest level of
socialist development the state would rely less on coercion and more on persua-
sion .... Law would be replaced by other means of social control."' 82 Thus, the
law served a temporary, but necessary, evil role. Mikhail Krasnov suggests that
"[s]uch a view clearly directly contradicts the meaning of a law-governed state,
and its legacy complicates Russia's ability to construct a law-governed state."
83
Such Marxist theories were abstract but influenced official and popular atti-
tudes concerning the nature of the law.84 The Bolsheviks eliminated courts,8 5
codes, and the profession of law in all of its manifestations. 86 Indeed, the law
was not simply regarded with disapproval, but its study was neglected and conse-
78 GARY ROSENSHIELD, WESTERN LAW, RUSSIAN JUSTICE: DOSTOEVSKY, THE JURY TRIAL, AND THE
LAW 181 (Univ. of Wis. Press 2005).
79 IDEAS AND FORCES IN SovIET LEGAL HISTORY: A READER OF THE SOVIET STATE AND LAW 95-96
(Zigurds L. Zile ed., Oxford Univ. Press 1992) (translating the Decree of the Council of People's Com-
missars, November 22 (December 5), 1917, "On the Court," SU 1917-1918, no. 4, item 50) [hereinafter
IDEAS AND FORCES].
80 Krasnov supra note 43, at 195 (quoting MARKSISTSKO-LENINSKAYA OBSHAYA TEORIYA
GOSUDARSTVA I PRAVA: ISTORICHESKIE TIPI GOSUDARSTVA I PRAVA [MARXIST-LENINIST GENERAL THE-
ORY OF STATE AND LAW: HISTORICAL TYPES OF STATE AND LAW] 418 (V. Guilev et al. eds., 1971).
81 Id.
82 BURNHAM, supra note 34, at 5.
83 Krasnov, supra note 43, at 195.
84 BURNHAM, supra note 34, at 5 (fueling legal nihilism in state administration and mass
consciousness).
85 Smith, Reforming, supra note 31, at 132 ("After the Russian Revolution of 1917, courts were
abolished and replaced with informal tribunals to handle various conflicts and administrative disputes.
Tribunals were favored because they resolved disputes on the basis of the 'revolutionary consciousness'
of ordinary workers, removing decisions from the elite corps of professional jurists.").
86 IDEAS AND FORCES, supra note 79, at 95-96.
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quently development of the legal profession was held back for many years. 87
Furthermore, under Communism, the law was used primarily as a "tool" if em-
ployed at all. 88 Kathryn Hendley suggests it was used "in a blatantly instrumen-
tal fashion"89 to promote the Communist Party. For example, the freedom of
speech was guaranteed - as long as it was consistent with the Party's interests. 90
Above all else stood the Communist Party. 9 1
Stalin's "dual state" 92 was characterized by rule of force, illuminating the dis-
connect between what was required of the masses and what was required of the
Communist Party. It was "rule of man," not rule of law, for the majority of
Russians. 93 Furthermore, although various iterations of Soviet constitutions con-
tained hundreds of provisions, they were merely illusory.94 Indeed, "telephone
justice," which linked procurators and judges' chambers to party offices, "en-
sur[ed] that the justice system served the state and not its citizens." 95 Addition-
ally, although legislation was published in official collections, such collections
"were poorly indexed and not easily available to lawyers or ordinary citizens. '96
These various factors facilitated an environment in which Russian leaders
"frequently reinterpreted, redefined, and repudiated such terms as constitutional-
ity, democracy, and rule of law."' 97 The sense that the law bound everyone, in-
cluding the political elite, which made up the Communist Party, simply did not
87 WORTMAN, supra note 61, at 288. Writers like Tolstoy considered "members of the judicial pro-
fession cold and un-Russian in their rational adherence to legal science. The intelligentsia saw true
justice as emanating from a just political, social, or ethical order - the creation of better legislators - and
not from a legal process guided by principles of jurisprudence." Id.
88 KURKCHIYAN, supra note 36, at 39.
89 Hendley, supra note 37, at 351.
90 See SMITH, REFORMING, supra note 31, at 82.
91 Newcity, Why Is There No Russian Atticus Finch, supra note 38, at 290 n.l15.
92 SMITH, REFORMING, supra note 31, at 34 (stating that Stalin's Dual-State characterized a political
leadership, which was "virtually unchallenged ... and the law merely reinforce[d] its rule by force and
political expediency." In particular, Stalin's 1936 Constitution laid out the powers of the state and the
rights and duties of the citizen. The law was intended to reinforce Stalin's dictatorship and much of the
terror was carried on outside established judicial institutions.).
93 Frances H. Foster, Parental Law, Harmful Speech, and the Development of Legal Culture: Russian
Judicial Chamber Discourse and Narrative, 54 WASH. & LEE L. Rv. 923, 974 (1997).
94 See SMITH, REFORMING, supra note 31, at 82.
Like most constitutions, the Soviet constitutions embodied the highest statement of the goals and
principles of the society .... however, the constitutions of the former USSR were not binding
legal documents in the sense that their articles were cited in court determinations .... Many
constitutional provisions remained unrealized, due to the absence of implementing legislation.
Id.
95 Louise I. Shelley, Why a Corrupt State Can't Be a Strong State: Corruption in the Post-Yeltsin
Era, 9 E. EUR. CONST. REv. 70, 72 (2000); see Scott. P. Boylan, The Status of Judicial Reform in Russia,
13 Am. U. INT'L L. Rv. 1327, 1327-28 (1998).
96 Hendley, supra note 37, at 363.
97 Foster, supra note 40, at 745; see Wilson, supra note 64.
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exist. 98 Rather, the rule of law was administered to the populace by the state in
an overtly paternalistic manner.
Russians grew increasingly skeptical of the law and legal institutions during
this era.99 The law was viewed as dishonest, inefficient, arbitrary, and hope-
less, 1°° which contributed to citizens feeling "uncertain and cynical about
whether legal guarantees have any meaning."' 01 For example, the Russian writer
Alexander Solzhenitsyn delivered a speech at Harvard University in 1978, criti-
cizing Western society's legalistic life. Solzhenitsyn was not an apologist for the
Communist regime, but it certainly nurtured his critical view of "the letter of the
law:"
I have spent all my life under a Communist regime and I will tell
you that a society without any objective legal scale is a terrible one in-
deed .... [However,] [a] society which is based on the letter of the law
and never reaching any higher fails to take advantage of the full range of
human possibilities. The letter of the law is too cold and formal to have
beneficial influence on society. Whenever the tissue of life is woven of
legalistic relations, this creates an atmosphere of moral mediocrity that
paralyzes man's noblest impulses. And it will be simply impossible to
bear up to the trials of this threatening century with nothing but the sup-
ports of a legalistic structure.10 2
Solzhenitsyn's deep distrust of the law illustrates how the paternalistic Soviet
system affected the Russian populace. Accordingly, the perpetuation of this legal
culture "stymied efforts to reform the legal system." 10 3 Even when Yeltsin came
to power, the public "did not realize the value of freedom."'' 4
98 See SMITH, REFORMING, supra note 31, at 129 (stating that "[tihe notion that the crown could be
held accountable to the law - a fundamental feature of English law since the Magna Carta in 1215 - was
never accepted by the monarchy nor by the Bolsheviks after the Revolution of 1917.").
99 See BURNHAM, supra note 34, at 5. Although it is tempting to blame the Communists, Russia's
struggle with instilling respect for the law goes back even further. For example, Russian serfs were
emancipated in 1861, and the first parliamentary institution to represent the masses, the State Duma,
which is the lower house of parliament, was established in 1905. Even then, the Tsar could still adopt
laws when the State Duma was not in session, which is illustrative of the limited legal power the Russian
people held, compared to that which the Tsar enjoyed. See KtRKCHIYAN, supra note 36, at 37. From a
historical perspective it is worth noting that until recently, the Russian people had never had the opportu-
nity to directly engage in their governmental process. During the Soviet era, party leaders exercised
control separate from the Russian populace. Before then, Tsars or other entities exercised similar control.
100 Wilson, supra note 64, at 198. See Interview with Peter Baker & Susan Glasser, Authors of
KREMLIN RISING: VLADIMIR PuTiN's RussIA AND THE END OF REVOLUTION (June 7, 2005), available at
http://www.washingtonpost.cormwp-dyn/content/discussion/2005/06/03/DI200506030 0 651.html (stating
that the Russian belief that government is inherently corrupt compelled many Russians to accept Putin,
simply because others may have been even more tainted than Putin); see Myers, supra note 35 (describ-
ing former President Putin's calls for "cementing the rule of law in Russia" and how law enforcement
often falls short of that lofty goal).
101 Smrru, REFORMING, supra note 31, at 228.
102 Aleksandr I. Solzhenitsyn, A World Split Apart, in SoizimENrrsY'N' AT HARvARD: THE ADDRESS,
TWELVE EARLY RESPONSES, AND Six LATER REFLECTIONS 3, 3-20 (Ronald Berman ed., 1980).
103 Hendley, supra note 37, at 352.
104 Krasnov, supra note 43, at 201.
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F. Post-Soviet Transition: Failure to Implement Western-Style Law
Russians emerged from the fall of Communism with a skeptical and ambiva-
lent vision of the law; however Russia was not absolutely devoid of all legal
tradition. Gorbachev attempted to "change the role of law."' 0 5 He ended rubber-
stamp legislatures, invoked pravovoe gosudarstvo, and "his policy of glasnost
allowed a glimpse into the law-making process for the first time."' 0 6 Thus, fol-
lowing the demise of the Soviet Empire, "Russia [was] not starting from scratch,
which certainly has advantages, but it has the disadvantage of a lot of bad legal
habits."107
To a certain degree, Russians optimistically believed that adopting a western-
style rule of law might solve all their problems.1 08 Although Russians recog-
nized that transitioning to a western-style rule of law would be difficult, no one
imagined how difficult it would be. 1°9 "It was a grave disillusion, a crushing of
ideals,"' 10 particularly because outsiders heavily influenced Russian legal reform
and the development of a post-Soviet Russian legal system' 1' during this period.
The "legal scholars associated with the pro-reform Institute of State and Law"
who pushed for legal reforms, arrived with "considerable knowledge and exper-
tise about the legal systems in the United States, France, Germany, the Scandina-
vian countries, as well as the reformist Central European states, such as Poland
and Hungary."" x2 However, most of these experts and specialists had little or no
experience with the Russian legal experience.
Many of these individuals,
[A]pproached Russia as if it was a tabula rasa, disregarding what existed
on paper as well as prevailing legal culture. The top-down nature of these
reforms and the unwillingness to pay attention to the needs of those who
would be impacted felt familiar to Russians, who recognized the modus
operandi from their Soviet past, albeit under a new banner." 13
Absent from this dialogue were Russian legal reformers and scholars versed in
the Russian legal perspective. 1 " 4 Moreover, agencies like the American Bar As-
105 Hendley, supra note 37, at 352.
106 Id. at 353.
107 Kahn, Vladimir Putin, supra note 35, at 520.
108 See Smith, Russia, supra note 65, at 110.
109 See SMrr, RnORtpINo, supra note 31, at 224.
110 Interview with Alexander Solzhenitsyn, prominent Russian writer and Nobel laureate (July 23,
2007), available at http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/0, 1518,496211,00.html.
111 See Hendley supra note 37, at 353 (stating that "[tihe inexperience of Russian policy makers with
market democracy caused them to turn to Western advisors for assistance in writing the new laws and
creating the necessary institutions, especially under Yeltsin.").
112 SMiTH, REFORMING, supra note 31, at 87.
113 Hendley, supra note 37, at 353.
114 See Ignatius, A Tsar Is Born, supra note 41 (explaining that those present were "the legions of Ivy
League - and other Western-educated 'experts' who roamed the halls of the Kremlin and the govern-
ment, offering advice, all ultimately ineffective, on everything from conducting free elections to using
'shock therapy' to juice the economy .... ).
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sociation and the Federal Bureau of Investigation participated, but had no back-
ground in, or experience with, the Russian legal system.1 15
Thus, much of what was instituted and established in Russia during this post-
Soviet transitional period was both foreign and unfamiliar to Russians. It is pos-
sible that the reforms were not simply incompatible, but also incapable of dealing
with an inherently complicated and necessarily distinct citizenry and nation. As
Thomas Friedman stated:
[F]or the first time in history, we all have the same basic piece of hard-
ware - free markets. The question is, which countries will get the eco-
nomic operating systems (neoliberal macroeconomics) and software
(regulatory institutions and laws) to get the most out of those free markets
.... Russia is the egregious example of a country that plugged into the
herd with no operating system and no software, with predictably horren-
dous results.' 16
Western influences were "often introduced under the aegis of bilateral and mul-
ticultural aid and technical assistance programs, and a rising tide of national iden-
tity and desire for sovereignty among peoples of the former USSR" developed. 
1 7
Russians soon regarded these foreign legal reformers as imperialists, seeking to
indoctrinate them with western beliefs and institute a western system." 8 Stephen
Sestanovich, who served as the State Department's special advisor for the new
Independent States of the former Soviet Union under President Bill Clinton, said,
"the '90s sucked."'1 19 Ultimately, although Western advisors had good intentions
and were eager to help, "most were ill-equipped to fashion laws that met the
needs of this transitional polity. ' 120 Indeed, by the end of the 1990s, although
Russians yearned for change, the "new laws felt like more of the same," since
they "look[ed] good on paper, but [were] ignored in practice."'121
G. The Current Development of Russia's Legal Vision: a Hybrid Legal
Culture
Putin, like many of his predecessors, seems to use the law as a "tool. 1 22 Al-
though present-day Russia lacks a western-style rule of law, a uniquely Russian
vision of the law is nonetheless, developing. Several recent occasions illustrate
this development. Putin stepped down from the Presidency in May 2008 on his
115 See SMrrH, REFORMING, supra note 31, at 231.
116 Thomas L. Friedman, A Manifesto For the Fast World, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 28, 1999, §6, at 40.
117 See SMITH, REFORMING, supra note 31, at 228.
118 See Ignatius, A Tsar Is Born, supra note 41.
119 Id.
120 Hendley, supra note 37, at 368. "For example, the Western advisors who drafted the joint-stock
company put protections into place for minority investors that would have worked beautifully in their
own countries (e.g., cumulative voting and prohibitions on insider trading), but which did little good in
Russia." Id. n.65.
121 Id. at 368-69.
122 KURKCHIYAN, supra note 36, at 39.
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own accord, and then Medvedev called to lengthen the presidential term in No-
vember 2008, thereby illustrating Russian leaders' newfound willingness to be
bound by rules. Consequently, the Russian populace is increasingly optimistic
about the developing rule of law in Russia.
1. Putin Steps Down from the Presidency
In May 2008,123 Putin stepped down from the Russian Presidency after having
served two consecutive terms,124 and handed it to Medvedev. This transition
occurred in accordance with Russian law. Importantly, the Russian Constitution
states: "One and the same person cannot hold the office of the President of the
Russian Federation for more than two terms running."' 125 Thus, Putin was consti-
tutionally precluded from serving a third consecutive term. However, Putin never
sought to negotiate his way around the term limit, despite much speculation.
Rather, Putin accepted that the Constitution precluded a third term.
The fact that Putin willingly handed over power speaks volumes about Rus-
sia's developing vision of the law. 126 Few Russian leaders have stepped down
from power on their own accord, as Putin did. Moreover, no one who stepped
down willingly was as "young, physically able, and politically strong"1 27 as Pu-
tin. Thus, there was an even greater likelihood that Putin could have potentially
refused to step down because he is so politically fit and popular throughout Rus-
sia. Indeed, President Putin consistently boasted high approval ratings at around
seventy percent, 128 suggesting that the populace may not have responded nega-
tively had he refused to step down.
Supporters pushed Putin to amend the Russian Constitution so that he could
remain in power, but Putin "demurred. The Constitution was sacrosanct."' 129
Specifically, Putin's decision to abide by the Russian Constitution illustrates how
123 See Chivers, Medvedev Takes Oath, supra note 5.
124 See Ignatius, A Tsar Is Born, supra note 41.
125 Konst. RF art. 81.
126 See SMITH, REFORMING, supra note 31, at 237.
During this transition phase the laws themselves and their enforcement may be less than perfect,
but what is important is that they are functioning, however imperfectly. Laws matter. Rights are
now being recognized and new generations of Russians are growing up in a rapidly evolving
culture in which justice and rule of law are not empty slogans masking authoritarian rule and the
arbitrary exercise of power.
Id.; see SAMUEL HUNTINGTON, THE THRD WAVE: DEMOCRATIZATION tN THE LATE TwErTH CENTURY
266-67 (Univ. of Okla. Press 1991).
One criterion for measuring this [democratic] consolidation is the two-turnover test. By this
test, a democracy may be viewed as consolidated if the party or group that takes power in the
initial election at the time of transition loses a subsequent election and turns over power to those
election winners, and if those election winners then peacefully turn over power to the winners of
a later election. Selecting rulers through elections is the heart of democracy, and democracy is
real only if rulers are willing to give up power as a result of elections.
Id.
127 Kahn, Vladimir Putin, supra note 35, at 558.
128 Ignatius, A Tsar Is Born, supra note 41.
129 Megan Stack, Putin Leads in This Power Dance; Any Talk That His Prot~g and Successor Might
Upstage Him Has Been Laid to Rest, L.A. TIMEs, Nov. 14, 2008, at A3.
110 Loyola University Chicago International Law Review Volume 7, Issue 2
Through the Russian Looking Glass
much Russia has developed. Putin showed that he too, was bound by Russian
laws and the Constitution - even though he was the president. Again, although
few Russian leaders have stepped down when their terms expired, even fewer
Russian leaders have recognized that the law binds them. Accordingly, Putin's
behavior confirms and validates the Russian Constitution.
2. Medvedev's Call to Amend the Constitution
During his Address to the Federal Assembly of the Russian Federation, Presi-
dent Medvedev proposed to amend the Russian Constitution by extending the
presidential term from four years to six. 130 Immediately, critics protested this as
an unconstitutional proposal intended to facilitate Putin's return to the presi-
dency,' 3 ' as soon as 2009 by some estimates. 132 However, what remains vital,
and something that many have failed to recognize or appreciate, is that in seeking
to amend the Russian Constitution, Medvedev followed procedure and worked
within the established framework of the Constitution - a huge step in the right
direction towards solidifying a stronger rule of law in Russia.
To amend the Constitution, the Russian President must submit a draft bill 33 to
the lower house of Russia's parliament, the State Duma, 134 which votes on the
bill. If a majority of the State Duma votes in favor of the bill, it may then be-
come law, 135 assuming that a majority of the upper house of Russia's parliament,
the Council of Federation, also votes for it. Alternatively, according to the Rus-
sian Constitution, the bill is assumed to have passed if the upper house does not
examine the bill within fourteen days. 136 Assuming the bill passes both Houses,
it may be treated as federal law. At this point, it is submitted to the President for
signing and promulgation.' 37
130 Medvedev Address, supra note 4 (stating that "we should increase the constitutional mandates of
the President and State Duma to six and five years respectively.").
131 See Tony Halpin, Fast Deal May Set up Putin as President for Twelve Years, TIMES (London),
Nov. 13, 2008, at 39 (stating that "[bly engineering his return to the Kremlin, however, Mr. Putin will
strengthen criticism that Russia is sliding into dictatorship."). Interestingly, Medvedev's call to amend
the Constitution will not affect him, further evidence that change has taken root in Russia. This contrasts
with the time President Yeltsin sought to consolidate his own power in 1993.
132 Id. (explaining "[Medvedev] would then resign and call a snap election to make way for his men-
tor to return. Mr. Putin would govern for two more terms of six years each, until 2021 .... ).
133 Konst. RF art. 104(1) ("The right of legislative initiative shall belong to the President of the Rus-
sian Federation, members of the Council of Federation, deputies of the State Duma, the Government of
the Russian Federation, and legislative (representative) bodies of constituent entities of the Russian
Federation.").
134 Id. art. 84(d) ("The President of the Russian Federation ... shall submit draft laws to the State
Duma ....").
135 Id. art. 105(l)-(2) ("Federal laws shall be adopted by the State Duma. Federal laws shall be
adopted by a majority of votes of the total number of deputies of the State Duma, unless otherwise
envisaged by the Constitution of the Russian Federation . . . ").
136 Id. art. 105(4) ("A federal law shall be considered to have been approved by the Council of Federa-
tion if over half of the total number of members of that chamber have voted for it or if the Council of
Federation does not examine it within fourteen days .... ").
137 Id. art. 107(2) ("The President of the Russian Federation shall sign the federal law and promulgate
it within fourteen days.").
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In amending the presidential term, Medvedev adhered to the process laid out
in the Russian Constitution. 138 First, Medvedev submitted his proposed bill to
the State Duma shortly after he expressed an interest in amending the presidential
term on November 5, 2008.139 On November 21, 2008, the State Duma voted
392-57 to approve the bill. 140 After the State Duma, the bill went to the Council
of Federation, which also passed it. 141 Medvedev then signed the federal law on
December 30, 2008, after it passed through the necessary and appropriate legal
channels. 142
The current path to amending the presidential term pursuant to the Russian
Constitution, starkly contrasts "those bloody days in Moscow in late 1993"'' 43
when the Constitution had little or no weight. Indeed, the Constitution could not
prevent the 1993 crisis that included some of the most violent street fighting in
Moscow since the Bolshevik October Revolution in 1917.14 Specifically, in Oc-
tober 1993, President Yeltsin 45 confronted the Russian parliament seeking to
expand his Presidential powers. 146
Demonstrators and police clashed, television stations were stormed, 14 7 and
there were "rumors of troop movements."' 148 On television, Yeltsin explained
that he had no choice: "It is impossible not only to implement difficult reforms,
but to maintain elementary order." 149 Ultimately, Yeltsin secured more presiden-
tial powers for himself and normalcy eventually returned to Moscow. Those
days in 1993, however, stand in sharp contrast to the civility emblematic of
Medvedev's 2008 constitutional amendment. Perhaps most striking about the
2008 amendment was the lack of attention paid to such an historic event. It was
almost a non-event.
138 See Russia Lawmakers OK Longer Presidential Terms: Bill Could Help Speed Ex-President Pu-
tin's Return to the Kremlin, MSNBC.coM, Nov. 21, 2008, available at http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/
27841709/ [hereinafter Russia Lawmakers OK].
139 See Medvedev Address, supra note 4.
140 Russia Lawmakers Ok, supra note 138.
141 Philip P. Pan, Russia Lengthens Presidential Tenures, WASH. POST, Dec. 30, 2008, at A12.
142 Id.
143 SM-IH, REFORMING, supra note 31, at 233.
144 See id. at 232-33.
145 See Adi Ignatius, Boris Yeltsin, TIME, Apr. 26, 2007, at 27 (LEXIS) (stating that Boris Yeltsin
was the Russian Federation's first President. He served from 1991-1999, at which point, he stepped
down to let Putin takeover) [hereinafter Ignatius, Boris Yeltsin]. It is worth noting that Yeltsin was
Russia's first popularly elected President. Although he won fifty-seven percent of the vote, he ultimately
left the position with approval ratings in the single digits. Boris Yeltin, Wikipedia, http://
en.wikipedia.org/wiki/BorisYeltsin (last visited Apr. 16, 2010). See generally Gessen, supra note 20
(explaining that under Yeltsin, "Russia's larger-than-life first post-Soviet president," the Russian econ-
omy and politics careened out of control and into crisis).
146 See Margaret Shapiro, Yeltsin Dissolves Parliament, Orders New Vote, WASH. Posr, Sept. 22,
1993, at Al.
147 Id.
148 Id.
149 Id.
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H. Reasons Why Russia's Unique Vision of the Rule of Law May Endure
Must constitutions be fixed? 150 Few constitutions are static documents that
spring into existence fully formed.1 51 Instead, strong and successful constitutions
possess the ability to develop and evolve over time to respond to changing politi-
cal, economic, and social conditions. t52 Thus, as Russia continues to develop
and evolve, it necessarily demands a constitution that can do so, too.' 53 Cer-
tainly, it is feasible that Medvedev's call to amend the Russian Constitution was
prompted by the various changes that Russia is currently experiencing. Indeed,
Medvedev's "eagerness to change the [C]onstitution was rooted in uncertainty
over shifting global dynamics, especially Russian wariness of America in the
wake of Russia's war with the U.S.-backed Georgia. By ruling longer, ...
Medvedev hopes to create greater stability."' 5 4 Thus, because the Russian Con-
stitution has proven capable of dealing with Russia during this volatile period, its
flexibility and legitimacy are confirmed.
Furthermore, some of the U.S. criticism regarding Medvedev's call to amend
the presidential term is seemingly hypocritical. For example, in 2008, New York
City too, moved to extend its own mayoral term limit from eight years to twelve,
due to the city's ongoing financial crisis, thereby allowing New York City's cur-
rent mayor, Michael R. Bloomberg, to seek a third consecutive term.' 55 Support-
ers of the proposed New York City bill, which subsequently passed, said that the
"dire economic situation confronting the city ... demanded continuity of leader-
ship."' 156 Certainly, New York City has had to deal with the financial crisis, but
150 See Norman Stone, Putin Rescued Russia from Disaster: So Let's Just Let Him Be, TIMES
(London), Oct. 4, 2007, at 5 (suggesting that "[t]here is no real reason for constitutions to be set in tablets
of stone."); see also Kahn, Vladimir Putin, supra note 35, at 555 n.212.
The Russian [C]onstitution is not a sacred document. Some will argue that the events between
October-December 1993, where a flawed referendum followed the use of force against the Rus-
sian Supreme Soviet, gives the present [Clonstitution an aura of illegitimacy that anyone con-
cemed with the rule of law cannot help but be troubled by .... If [the] United Russia [political
party] overwhelmingly controls the State Duma after the next round of legislative elections, then
the [C]onstitution should be amended.
Id.
151 See Sewell Chan & Jonathon P. Hicks, Council Votes, 29 to 22, to Extend Term Limits, N.Y.
TIMES, Oct. 23, 2008, available at http://cityroom.blogs.nytimes.com/2008/10/23/council-to-debate-term-
limits-change/. Again, it is worth noting that in 2008, New York City extended the mayoral term limit to
three terms.
152 SMrH, REFORMING, supra note 31, at 102-03.
153 See Medvedev Address, supra note 4.
[T]he personal freedom and the maturity of the democratic institutions and procedures that [the
Constitution] guarantees are the source for our continued development. Now, as we come to a
new age in our development, we are setting new goals that call for greater participation by our
citizens, political parties and other public institutions.
Id.
154 Stack, supra note 129.
155 Michael Barbaro & Femanda Santos, Bloomberg Gets His Bill, and a Public Earful, N.Y. TIMES,
Nov. 4, 2008, at Al.
156 Chan & Hicks, supra note 151.
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so too has Russia.' 57 Thus, if New York City can change its term limits, should
not Russia be permitted as well? In any event, regardless of the soundness of
New York City's plan to amend its own rules, Russia has received significantly
more criticism.
Moreover, against these political and economic developments is the Russian
"revolutionary consciousness," a term that exemplifies the fact that when Rus-
sians seek change, it has all-too-often been both drastic and revolutionary. 58
Russians have historically "desire[d] to do too much too quickly," as opposed to
"gradual, more effective methods of reform."' 59 By contrast, Russia's political
leaders are currently exercising prudence by working within the appropriate legal
channels - the Russian Constitution - rather than making sudden, irrational, or
radical changes or moves.' 60 Compounding this promising behavior are the seri-
ous problems Russia is undoubtedly facing.' 61 This makes Russia's steady
course even more impressive.
Finally, it is easy to forget that the second Russian Revolution of 1991 oc-
curred only nineteen years ago, meaning that Russia has been a democracy for
less than two decades. 162 Indeed, the rule of law in Russia today has existed for
157 See Medvedev Address, supra note 4 (stating that "[t1he global financial crisis also began as a
'local crisis' on the U.S. domestic market .... [But] when the U.S. economy began to slide it pulled
financial markets all around the globe with it in its fall. The crisis has now become global in scale.").
158 See Interview with Peter Baker & Susan Glasser, supra note 100 (suggesting that as Russia is the
birthplace of revolution, this may be the historical ebb to that flow).
159 ROBERT B. AHDIEH, RUSSIA'S CONSTrruTIONAL REVOLUTION: LEGAL CONSCIOUSNESS AND THE
TRANSITION TO DEMOCRACY, 1985-1996, at 9 (Pa. State Univ. Press 1997).
160 See SMITH, REFORMING, supra note 31, at 94.
The course that Yeltsin and Russia was taking had few if any models to follow. The Ameri-
can and French Revolutions toppled colonial or monarchial regimes and sought a clean break
from the past. In the Russian case, the revolution was being attempted from the top down.
Rather than experiencing a clean break from the past, Yeltsin was attempting a "controlled" and
orderly revolution. The stakes were high and there was no guarantee that if one side saw that it
was losing the argument, it would not resort to violence to preserve its interests.
Id.
161 See Medvedev Address, supra note 4.
I want you all to know that our goals remain unchanged. The sharp fluctuations in the
political and economic situation, the turbulence in the world economy and even the rise in mili-
tary and political tension will not serve as a pretext for dismantling democratic institutions or for
nationalising industry and finance. Citizens' political freedom ... [is] sacred ....
Those who want to make some "easy" political capital out of the global economic crisis, who
have their hearts set on populist chatter and want to destabilise society in order to satisfy their
personal ambitions, I advise them to read the Constitution. I consider it my duty to warn those
who seek to provoke tension in a political situation. We will not allow anyone to inflame social
• ..strife, deceive people and draw them into illegal action. We will continue to maintain
Constitutional order through all the legal means.
162 See SMITH, REFORMING, supra note 31, at 234 (stating that democracy took centuries to evolve in
Western Europe); see Medvedev Address, supra note 4.
1 remind you that the Russian Constitution celebrates its fifteenth anniversary in December.
What is important is not the date itself of course, but the fact that it is a Constitution that upholds
freedom and justice, human dignity and welfare, protection of family and Fatherland, and the
unity of our multiethnic people - not just as common values, but as legal concepts. In other
words, the Constitution gives them force in practice and supports them with all the resources of
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less than "the span of a single generation."' 163 Building a federal system and
culture of legality takes time and it would be presumptuous to assume that within
a few years Russia could abandon its history of legal nihilism' 64 and convert an
ardently skeptical populace into one with "a mindset that appreciates, responds
to, and engages in the exercise of legal self-limitation."1 65 Developing a willing-
ness to be bound by the rule of law takes time, particularly in Russia, a country
that has historically struggled with the very concept. 16 6 As Russia necessarily
lacks a strong foundation or model rule of law that Putin and Medvedev can rely
upon, the Russian peoples' willingness to follow the law is impressive.
Accordingly, instead of rolling back progress, Russia's political leadership has
demonstrated its desire to establish a legal culture and rule of law by working
through the appropriate channels of Russian law. Such embraces should be com-
mended as progress. To that end, it is misguided to suggest that any mistakes
along the way indicate that Russia is not necessarily moving in the right direc-
tion. Mistakes are inevitable and perhaps they are signs of democracy at work,
since democracies are liable to falter. One might even contend that this revolu-
tionary development means that Russians have finally developed a belief in
themselves and their leaders, as they are finally holding themselves accountable.
In any event, embracing a stable rule of law free of the paternalistic overtones of
past Russian governments will take years to fully develop.
the state and with all of its own authority. The Constitution forms our social institutions and the
way of life of millions of people.
Id.
163 Kahn, supra note 35, at 521.
164 See Medvedev Address, supra note 4. President Medvedev explained that the Constitution is im-
portant to develop "a new legal system and independent courts, and in combating corruption and legal
nihilism." Id. He further noted,
[LIegal nihilism is not a new phenomenon in Russia but is something that has its deep roots in
our distant past. Fifteen years is too short a time to eradicate such deeply-rooted traditions. But
it is also true that we have not yet made a deep-reaching systematic attempt to address this
problem of disregard for the law.
Id.
165 JEFFREY KAHN, FEDERALISM, DEMOCRATIZATION, AND THE RULE OF LAW IN RUSSIA 280 (Oxford
Univ. Press 2002). "Progress in developing a state governed by the rule of law" began during
Gorbachev's time in power, and the progress forged "was impressive when viewed against Russian and
Soviet legal traditions." However, "For such concepts to take root, they must be institutionalized and
inculcated into the legal culture of a society." SMrH, REFORMING, supra note 31, at 76.
These contentious issues had to be resolved in an atmosphere of political and economic turmoil.
Furthermore, unlike the American [C]onstitution that was drafted behind closed doors by an elite
group of white, well-educated, wealthy, male land-owners, the new constitution in Russia was
being worked out in the glare of television lights and involved a vast array of interest groups,
factions, political parties, and prominent political figures, seeking to maximize their particular
interests.
Id. at 80.
166 Smith, supra note 31, at 103.
It is encouraging that all parties in Russia today - even the extremists on the right - appear to
recognize the legitimacy of the new constitution and are operating within its provisions. This is
the best indication yet that Russia is on its way to constitutionalism. However, given its centu-
ries-long tradition of dictatorial and arbitrary rule, it will be a long and perilous journey.
Id.
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III. Russia's Vision of Democracy: Balancing A Strong State Ideal &
Democratic Values
For Russians a strong state is not an anomaly that should be gotten rid of.
Quite the contrary, they see it as a source and guarantor of order, and the initiator
and main driving force of any change .... I am not calling for totalitarianism
.... A strong state power in Russia is democratic, law-based, workable federa-
tive state.
-Vladimir Putin 167
The Russian mentality needs a baron, a tsar, a president... in one word, a boss.
-Valentina Matviyenko 168
To many Americans, Russia is moving away from democracy, and towards a
burgeoning authoritarian regime. 169 However, this is ill conceived. Putin and
now Medvedev, have not necessarily rolled back democracy as many fear or
suspect. Specifically, the Russian people desire a strong state 170 embodied by a
strong leader - the strong-state ideal. 171 Following the Soviet-era, which over-
emphasized this strong-state ideal, came the post-Soviet era, which overempha-
sized implanted western-democratic ideals.' 72 After having survived both
periods, Russia is now developing its own unique hybrid version of democracy,
which seeks to balance the traditional Russian strong state 173 with modem demo-
cratic values. 174
A. Components of Russian Democracy: Balancing Strong State and
Democratic Ideals.
1. Strong Mother Russia: Derzhavnost
Central to the Russian worldview is the desire for Russia, "the Motherland," to
possess international status and influence. 175 "Russians are very patriotic people,
167 Stephen Handelman, Shadows on the Wall: Putin's Law-and-Order Dilemma, 9 E. EUR. CoNsr.
REV. 88, 88 (2000) (quoting Vladimir Putin, Rossiya na rubezhe tysyacheletii [Russia on the Threshold of
the Millennium], NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA, Dec. 30, 1999, http://www.ng.ru/politics/1999-12-30/4-
millenium.html).
168 BAKER & GLASSER, supra note 66, at 371.
169 See Gessen, supra note 20 (stating that "[o]nce, [the Kremlin] was the symbol of a nascent Russian
democracy. Now it's the command center of an entrenched Russian autocracy."); see Struck, supra note
30, (stating that Western critics allege that Putin "has throttled democracy," and that former Soviet leader
Mikhail Gorbachev disapproves of some of Putin's "moves to consolidate power.").
170 See Thomas F. Remington, Russia and the "Strong State" Ideal, 9 E. EUR. CoNsr. REV. 65, 68
(2000) (quoting an intemet article by Vladimir Putin where he stated, the "state's structures and institu-
tions have always played an extremely important role [in Russia].").
171 See id. at 65-69.
172 See SMITn, REFORMING, supra note 31, at 228-31.
173 See Remington, supra note 170, at 65-69. "Calls to strengthen the state have become widespread
in Russia." Id. at 65. See Handelman, supra note 167, at 88-91.
174 See Remington, supra note 170, at 65 (stating that people on both sides "t[ook] for granted that
Russia's statehood was weakened by the unsuccessful reforms of the 1990s and that the restoration of
state strength must now take high priority.").
175 See id. at 69.
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they want Russian spoken, they want their views to be the correct ones, and they
want a leader who projects these things."' 76 In this sense, Russians have histori-
cally desired a strong Russia, or derzhavnost, the status of being a great world
power. 177 Consequently, Russians have accepted leaders who provided a strong
image and international status, even if that necessarily resulted in diminished
individual rights or the diminution of other principles of western-style
democracy. 17
8
The Soviet model adhered to this sensibility by overemphasizing the strong
state ideal. Arguably, "[n]o political system has ever been more hostile to civil
society than the communist totalitarian regime Stalin erected."1 79 This ultimately
resulted in "[f]lat living standards, the burden of penurious third-world client
states, and technological lag," which ultimately "convinced younger Soviet lead-
ers and thinkers that the Soviet model of a strong state had led to a dead end."' 180
The Gorbachev years marked the final period of this era, and "new ideas arose
that challenged the older, simplistic version of the strong state ideal."'' 8 1 Indeed,
Russians sought new models, including the concept of pravovoe gosudarstvo -
a symbolic departure away from the strong-state ideal, and so a period that re-
sembled a "law-governed state" emerged.' 82
2. The 1990s: The Loss of National Pride
Although the demise of the Soviet Empire resulted in the development of a
western-style democracy,1 83 the honeymoon did not last long. Adding to the fact
it no longer retained hegemonic status alongside the United States, Russia soon
176 Interview with Peter Baker & Susan Glasser, supra note 100 (of course this begs the question of
whether this characterizes the United States, as well).
177 See Remington, supra note 170, at 69, (stating that "Russians have believed for centuries that
Russia should be [a great world] power").
178 See Madeline Albright, The 2008 Time 100: Vladimir Putin, TIME, Apr. 30, 2009, available
at: http://www.time.com/time/specials/2007/article/0,28804,1733748_1733757_1735578,00.html (stating
that Russians "celebrate national traditions and prize collective glory, not individual freedom."); see
Remington, supra note 170, at 66.
Peter and Stalin are paired in the minds of many ultranationalists today as heroic figures who
expanded the industrial base of the state, increased the state's control over society, and made
Russia a mighty and feared military power in the world. The ideal of the "strong state" in the
sense of derzhava - a great world power - is inseparable, for such self-styled patriots, from the
image of a commanding patriarchal leader who, through force of will, defeats all natural and
social enemies to build up the state's formidable might.
Id.
179 Michael McFaul et al., Introduction to BETWEEN DICTATORSHIP AND DEMOCRACY: RUSSIAN POST-
COMMUNIST POImcMA REFORM 1, 14 (Carnegie Endowment for Int'l Peace 2004).
180 Remington, supra note 170, at 67.
181 Id. Mikhail Gorbachev was the last General Secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet
Union. He served from 1985-1991. See C.J. Chivers, Gorbachev, Rebuking Putin, Criticizes Russian
Elections, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 29, 2008, at A8.
182 Remington, supra note 170, at 67.
183 See SMITH, REFORMING, supra note 31, 226-27 (stating that at the beginning of the transition,
"Russians openly spoke of joining the ranks of 'civilized' countries .... Many unrealistically assumed
that economic stabilization and recovery could be achieved in a matter of a few years.").
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experienced corruption, 184 the ransacking of national industries by oligarchs,185 a
stock market crash, 186 persistent economic stagnation,187 declining age expec-
tancy, 188 and a declining population, 189 hardly what Russians envisioned west-
ern-style democracy would provide. Ultimately, democracy, or at least the type
that the West had imposed on Russians, was not the "savior" for which Russians
had hoped. ' 90
This post-Soviet era left Russians humiliated and floundering in third-world
status' 91 and "the perception of the West as mostly a 'knight of democracy' [was]
replaced with the disappointed belief that pragmatism, often cynical and selfish,
l[ay] at the core of Western policies."' 92 Equally important, Russian President
Yeltsin was considered a buffoon and fool. 19 3 Specifically, the Yeltsin years
were characterized by an "ailing, intoxicated president who disappeared for
weeks at a stretch, while his government failed to pay wages and frittered away
billions of dollars of international aid." 19 4 Not only was President Yeltsin an
embarrassment domestically within Russia, he was also regarded as ridiculous
abroad, which only compounded Russians' sense of embarrassment and
humiliation. 195
Russians, who had always reveled in the stature of their great nation became
disillusioned with "the obvious weakening of state power"' 96 at the direction of
their first post-Soviet leader, Boris Yeltsin. Russians began to yearn for some-
thing other than Yeltsin, 197 and something other than a western-style democracy.
"Russians desperately awaited a new leader who would put the 1990s behind
them" 98 and restore greatness to their "hobbled nation."' 99
184 See id. at 235 ("The outbreak of crime in Russia [during the 1990s] [was] a system of the collapse
of order.").
185 See Gessen, supra note 20.
186 See Handelman, supra note 167, at 89 (discussing the 1998 Russian stock market crash and ensu-
ing financial crisis.).
187 Id.
188 See SMITH, REFORMING, supra note 31, at 187.
189 See BAKER & GLASSER, supra note 66, at 194.
190 See supra note 183 and accompanying text; see Fred Weir, KGB Influence Still Felt in Russia, THE
CHRISTIAN ScI. MONITOR, Dec. 30, 2003, at 6.
191 Interview with Alexander Solzhenitsyn, in London, Eng. (Aug. 5, 2008), available at http://
www.independent.co.uk/arts-entertainment/books/features/alexander-solzhenitsyn-his-final-interview-88
5152.html.
192 Id.
193 See Ignatius, Boris Yeltsin, supra note 145.
194 BAKER & GLASSER, supra note 66, at 39.
195 See id.; see also Gessen, supra note 20.
196 Remington, supra note 170, at 65.
197 See Gessen, supra note 20 (Putin had "all qualities for which Russia, exhausted and embarrassed
by Yeltsin's provincialism and unpredictability, seemed to yearn.").
198 BAKER & G[.ASSER, supra note 66, at 39.
199 Id. at 38.
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Consequently, the term "democracy" was removed from many presidential
speeches by the end of the 1990s because it had become so severely tarnished.
"'Democracy' was not [then] - if it had ever been - a goal supported by much
of the population, and the very word had been discredited, an epithet that had
come to be associated with upheaval rather than opportunity.112°° More than
ever, many Russians "believed authoritarianism was the only path for their coun-
try."20' As Peter Baker and Susan Glasser have suggested, Russia was a "coun-
try in between" when Vladimir Putin arrived.20 2
3. The Putin Years: Restoration of A Strong Mother Russia and National
Pride
Vladimir Putin was Russia's "antidote to Boris Yeltsin. '20 3 Although he was
introduced to his country as "young, energetic, decisive, determined, worldly,
reform-minded, [and] dependable, ''204 sobriety alone drew Russians to Putin.
Indeed, at that time, it did not take much to impress Russians - the bar had been
set quite low. One poll found that when Putin took office, forty percent of Rus-
sians expressed that what "they admired most in the new President was that he
was sober." °20 5 "Where past Russian leaders were sometimes bombastic, buf-
foonish, or fossilized, Putin seemed young and vigorous, cool and detached." 2 6
Putin asserted himself not long after taking office in 2000. He exclaimed that
"[o]ffending [Russia] will cost one dearly. '20 7 Without apologies, Putin even
stated that "the collapse of the Soviet empire 'was the greatest geopolitical trag-
edy of the century," 20 8 thereby reminding Russians of their inherent greatness
and strength - derzhavnost.20 9 Moreover, Putin "had the gift of seeming to be
all things to all people, of uniting an otherwise fractured society with soothing
words about stability and order."2 °10 After the previous decade that had been
marked by revolution and chaos, Putin now intended to "end the revolution."
21
'
He sought to bring order and stability to his people who had not been afforded
200 Id. at 3.
201 Id.
202 Id.
203 Id. at 39.
204 Gessen, supra note 20.
205 BAKER & GLASSER, supra note 66, at 39-40 (stating that "[s]obriety alone became a major element
of Putin's appeal, in contrast to his frequently drunken predecessor"); see Gessen, supra note 20.
206 BAKER & GLASSER, supra note 66, at 40.
207 Otkrytoe pismo Vladimira Putina k rossiyskim izboratelyam [Open Letter from Vladimir Putin to
Russian Voters] (2000), available at http://www.ticketsofrussia.ru/gov/putin/letter.html [hereinafter Open
Letter].
208 Putin: Soviet Collapse a "Genuine Tragedy," MSNBC.coM, Apr. 25, 2005, http://www.msnbc.
msn.com/idf7632057.
209 Remington, supra note 170, at 69.
210 BAKER & GLASSER, supra note 66, at 7.
211 Id.
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such luxuries. Putin declared: "The time of uncertainty and anxious expectations
is past."'212
Putin "reinterpret[ed] the [strong state] tradition in a pragmatic and moderniz-
ing spirit .. ,"213 which resonated with Russians, young and old. He ordered the
return of the Soviet anthem with slightly modified lyrics, decided to leave
Lenin's embalmed body in the Red Square, which his predecessor had ques-
tioned, and reinstated the Soviet red flag. 2 14 Putin even encouraged his country-
men to be proud of the accomplishments of the Soviet Union. He posited: "Was
there nothing but Stalin's prison camps and repression? What about the achieve-
ments of Soviet science, of the spectacular space flight of cosmonaut Yuri
Gagarin, of the art and music of cultural heroes like the composer Dmitri Shos-
takovich?" 21 5 Russians yearned to hear this "nationalism mixed with Soviet-era
symbolism." 216
Illustrative of Russia's sudden "reemergence," Putin secured a Russian city to
host the 2014 Olympic Winter Games, 21 7 an honor that had not been bestowed on
Russia since Moscow hosted the 1980 Summer Games. Indeed, when Russia
hosts the 2014 Winter Games, its people will no longer have to "suffer the indig-
nity of watching [their] athletes stand silent on the Olympic medals podium," as
was the case during the 2000 Summer Games in Sydney. 218
Moreover, after years of worshipping all things western, 21 9 the word nashe -
Russian for "ours"- has become en vogue.220 As Aleksandr Oslon, a Kremlin
pollster exclaimed: "It was very uncool to be Russian in the beginning of the
nineties .... Every newspaper and television show was obsessed with showing
how bad this country [was] and how hopeless we [were] and how good life is in
the West. Now it's cool to be Russian again."'221
212 Id. at 312.
213 Remington, supra note 170, at 69.
214 BAKER & GLASSER, supra note 66, at 65.
215 Id.
216 Id.
217 The 2014 Winter Games will be hosted by the Russian city of Sochi. This is the first post-Soviet
Olympic Games that will be held in Russia. It must be noted that more than most nations, Russia has
historically regarded its athletic accomplishments in the Olympics as a major source of national pride.
That their nation has secured the 2014 Winter Games is a huge victory for the Russian people and
something to credit Putin with having secured. Certainly, Russia would not have been rewarded with the
opportunity to host an Olympic Games if the Olympic Committee thought that Russia was incapable of
hosting. Therefore, from an international perspective, Russia is perceived as possessing a certain level of
stability and viability, or at least Russians' perception is that the rest of the world perceives it that way.
Interestingly, the last time the Olympic Games were held on Russian soil was in 1980, when Moscow
hosted the Summer Games, and which the United States boycotted. Much has changed.
218 BAKER & GLASSER, supra note 66, at 65.
219 See id. at 64.
220 See id. Aleksandr Nevzorov, an investigative journalist from St. Petersburg explained the concept
of nashi as "a circle of people - let it be enormous colossal, multimillion - to whom one is related by
common language, blood, and motherland." Id. at 74 (stating that some critics including Nevzorov, con-
tend that nashi has become darker during the previous several years).
221 Id. at 64.
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Putin has restored Russia2 22 to what its people believe is its rightful place
alongside other world powers, 2 23 while also "shepherd[ing] Russia into a bright
future of economic reform and stable democracy." 224 Putin certainly brought
Russia out of economic despair, following a period in which "the working
masses lost their life savings in an economic crash," while "the favored few
ripped off state assets in rigged auctions. '2 25 Almost symbolically, Putin penal-
ized those oligarchs that had pillaged Russia and had come to represent all that
was wrong with the 1990s - greed, corruption, rampant capitalism.226 "The era
of the oligarchs [was] over. 227
Putin instituted a thirteen percent flat tax, advanced new land codes to assist in
property purchases and sales, and instituted reforms to overhaul the "famously
corrupt and inefficient state electricity and natural gas monopolies. '228 Conse-
quently, conditions for the middle class have improved. 229 As Business Week's
Moscow bureau correspondent stated: "That's giving a lift to the mood in the
country. ' 230 Indeed, compared to "the basket case" that it was throughout the
1990s, "Russia's economy has grown an average of 7% a year for the past five
years. '"231 Even more impressive, under Putin, Russia paid off a foreign debt that
222 See Stone, supra note 150 (stating that Putin will be satisfied being acknowledged throughout the
world as the person who brought economic stability to Russia, and which, consequently, allowed for a
democratic renaissance in the country); see Richard Stengel, Person of the Year: Choosing Order Before
Reform, TIME, Dec. 31, 2007, at 42 (discussing Putin's "extraordinary feat of leadership in imposing
stability on a nation that has rarely known it and brought Russia back to the table of world power."); see
Struck, supra note 30 (stating that Gorbachev credited Putin because he "pulled Russia out of chaos" and
"1assured [it] a place in history"). Of course, Gorbachev qualified such statements with an acknowledge-
ment that the news media has been suppressed and that election rules are inconsistent with democratic
ideals. Id.
223 See Daniel Twining, WKLY. STANDARD, Jan. 16, 2006 (LEXIS) (stating that Russia "is reasserting
state control, in a concerted strategy to make Russia a great power once again."); see John Wendle, The
New Gambit: Moscow's View, TiME, Aug. 28, 2008, available at http://www.time.com/time/world/
article/0,8599,1836837,00.html (pro-Kremlin analyst Sergei Markov explains, "[i]f the U.S. and Britain
think they are first-level countries and Russia is a second-level country, we don't agree"; this is symbolic
of Russians still desiring to be counted as an equal).
224 Gessen, supra note 20.
225 BAKER & GLASSER, supra note 66, at 39.
226 See Gessen, supra note 20. Putin "launched an attack on Russia's oligarchs, who were forced to
give up their assets to the state or Putin's allies; many ... now live in exile, and at least two -Mikhail
Khodorkovsky and Platon Lebedev, the former owners of the country's largest oil producer, Yukos -
are behind bars." Id. Putin has even said he wants to continue his campaign against Russian oligarchs
from the 1990s. Id.
227 Charles Clover et al., Putin Says There is to be No Review of Privatisations, FINANcAL TIESS
(London), July 29, 2000, at 7.
228 BAKER & GLASSER, supra note 66, at 84.
229 Jason Bush, Russia: How Long Can the Fun Last?, Bus. WK., Dec. 7, 2006, available at:
www.businessweek.com/globalbizlcontentldec2006/gb2006t207_520461 .htm, (stating that in 2000, only
eight million qualified as middle class, but by 2006, this percentage had risen to about thirty-seven
percent of the population).
230 Id.
231 Ignatius, A Tsar Is Born, supra note 41.
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was once close to 200 billion dollars,2 32 the Russian economy grew from about
200 billion dollars in 2000, to about 920 billion dollars by 2006.233
Strengthening Russia's economy has provided Russia with a sense of "stability
and predictability," 234 and is a major reason Putin is still regarded as Russia's
savior and a "'great Russia[n] Patriot. '235 Indeed, an anti-revolution has occurred
in Russia. Ultimately, Putin represents something for which Russians can be
proud,236 and someone who has encouraged Russians to be proud of being Rus-
sian again.237 For these reasons, Putin's presidency, which was marked by "man-
aged democracy,"2 38 and "vertical of power," 239 represents a balance between the
traditional strong state ideal and more-modern democratic ideals - a uniquely
Russian hybrid-style vision of democracy. 240 This understanding is consistent
with former President George W. Bush's description of Russia in 2004. At a
summit in Santiago, Chile, an aid to President George W. Bush indicated that the
U.S. President understood that Russia needs a "'style of government that [is]
consistent with Russian history.' ",241
232 Id.
233 Lilia Shevtsova, Post-communist Russia: A Historic Opportunity Missed, 83 Irr'L AFF. 891, 894
(2007).
234 Kahn, Vladimir Putin, supra note 35, at 554.
None of this would matter, of course, if Putin's last eight years had not brought a sense of
stability and predictability to most Russians after the upheavals of the 1990s. Those two charac-
teristics are commonly considered to be two of the greatest benefits of the rule of law in a
society.
Id.; see J.D. Kahn, Russia's "Dictatorship of Law" and the European Court of Human Rights, 29 REV.
CENT. & E. EUR. L. 1, 1-14 (2004).
235 Interview with Peter Baker & Susan Glasser, supra note 100. According to a poll, 82% of Rus-
sians approved of Putin's leadership. Kahn, Vladimir Putin, supra note 35, at 554. This is almost a
fourteen-fold increase from his starting point in August 1999, when only 6% of Russians knew who he
was. Id. See SMiTH, REFORMING, supra note 31, at 228-29, (showing that the most revered institutions in
Russia remain the army, the church and the presidency. Although 62% of the populace expressed trust in
the army, only 7% expressed trust in political parties); see Struck, supra note 30 (stating that Gorbachev
believes "Putin salvaged the country from the ravages of... Boris Yeltsin, whose rule as president of
Russia from 1991 to 1999, set the country careening toward capitalism at the cost of great economic and
social turmoil . . . .'Now Russia is having a resurgence ....').
236 See Interview with Peter Baker & Susan Glasser, supra note 100.
237 BAKER & GLASSER, supra note 66, at 38 (Russians young and old now sing "Russia, Putin, Unity,"
illustrative of their newfound Russian pride.); see Duma Approves Old Soviet Anthem, CNN.coM, Dec. 8,
2000, http://archives.cnn.com/2000IWORLD/europell2/08/russia.anthem/; see Gessen, supra note 20
(stating that there remains a minority of critics within Russia, including one of Putin's former economic
advisors, Andrei Illarionov, who resigned in December 2005, and stated: "'It is one thing to work in a
country that is partially free' .... 'It is another thing when the country loses all political freedom ....
The very nature of the state has changed.').
238 McFaul et al., supra note 179, at 9. ("Putin's advisors have a term for this transformation of
democratic practices without altering formal democratic rules: 'managed democracy."').
239 BAKER & GLASSER, supra note 66, at 84. This has been described as "a single chain of command
with [Putin] at the top." Id.
240 See Remington, supra note 170, at 68 (explaining that "Russians want a strong state but also value
democratic liberties and the rule of law ...."). Moreover, Remington described the development of a
"'third way,' which is neither the radical neoliberalism of the early 1990s nor the ultranationalist statism
of the 'red-brown' extremists, but a reinterpretation of the ideal of a strong state." Id.
241 BAKER & GLASSER, supra note 66, at 377.
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B. Development of a Unique Russian Hybrid Democracy
Indeed, the balance of a strong state ideal and modem democratic values now
characterize Russia's vision of democracy. Specifically, the 2004 presidential
election reelecting Putin for a second term; the unique tandem relationship be-
tween Medvedev and Putin as President and Prime Minister, respectively; and
finally, Medvedev's most recent call to amend the Constitution highlight the de-
velopment of Russia's democracy. These occasions illustrate the coexistence of
Russia's traditional strong state ideal with more modem and open democratic
principles.
1. 2004 Presidential Election: Putin, Again
When President Putin won the Presidency in March 2004, he earned more than
seventy percent of the popular vote, easily securing a second term.242 The elec-
tion results indicated that Russians were generally pleased with Putin. However,
the election also highlighted several very important features of Russian democ-
racy. First, it illustrated Russians' newfound ability to directly choose their Pres-
ident.243  Specifically, Russians have frequently voted since "the first
semicompetitive election in the Soviet Union in the spring of 1989."2
44
Russians receive a holiday on election day, unlike Americans, which has com-
pelled some criticism that there exists a "voting tax"245 in the United States. In
any event, Russians are voting more than ever before. Voter turnout has "re-
mained solid even in the late 1990s, averaging more than 60 percent in national
elections. Evidently voters believe that these elections matter, '246 or else they
would not be participating. Furthermore, "the major stakeholders in Russia's
political and economic system continue to devote major resources to these electo-
ral processes, which suggests that the outcomes are not predetermined and have
consequences.
247
242 See Vladimir V. Putin, Times Topics, http://topics.nytimes.com/top/reference/timestopics/people/
p/vladimirv.putinlindex.html (last visited Apr. 16, 2010).
243 Konst. RF art. 81(4) ("The rules of electing the President of the Russian Federation shall [be]
determined by the federal law."). Putin has suggested that Russia's presidential election process, by
direct vote, is better and more democratic than the American process, which is complicated by an electo-
ral college that no one seems to actually understand.
244 Michael McFaul & Nikolai Petrov, Elections, in BETWEEN DICTATORSHIP AND DEMOCRACy: Rus-
StAN POsT-COMMtmIST POLITICAL REFOiRM 23, 23 (Michael McFaul et al. eds., Carnegie Endowment for
Int'l Peace 2004).
245 See Rachel Sklar, Rachel Maddow Decries "The New Poll Tax," Long Lines, HuFFiNGTON POST,
Nov. 3, 2008, available at http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2008/11/03/rachel-maddow-decries-lon_n_14
0455.html.
This is a poll tax. How much do you get paid for an hour of work? Do you have the kind of
job that would be delighted to give you an hour, a half-day, a whole day off work because you
were waiting in line at your precinct? Even if it won't cost you your job, can you afford to not
work those hours? Are you elderly or disabled, do you not have the physical stamina for this
kind of exertion? This is a poll tax .... Who is not in those lines - because they can't afford to
be?
Id.
246 McFaul & Petrov, supra note 244, at 52.
247 Id.
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The 2004 Russian presidential election also illustrated that although Russians
willingly embrace features of democracy, such as the right to vote, they still
yearn for a strong state. Russians knew Putin and his policies, since he had
served as President for the previous four years. Therefore, when Russians went
to the polls in 2004, they demonstrated a desire for an additional four years of the
strong state ideal, which Putin had clearly embodied during his first term.
2. Medvedev and Putin's Tandem-Relationship: An Unprecedented
Relationship?
Putin handed the Russian Presidency to Medvedev in May of 2008,248 and
soon thereafter accepted the position of Prime Minister, though it is clear that
Putin still retains a significant amount of power. Unquestionably, Putin "became
Russia's most powerful prime minister since the post was first established. ' '249 In
many respects, Putin continues to behave like the head of state. 250 Moreover,
soon after taking office, Medvedev referenced his tandem arrangement with Pu-
tin and indicated his desire to nurture it.251 Specifically, Medvedev said, "'no
one has any doubt that our tandem, our cooperation, will only continue to
strengthen. ' 252
Thus, a unique and very distinct relationship between the President and Prime
Minister has taken root. Although critics argue that Putin's assumption of power
is unlawful, as it is unprecedented for the Prime Minister to hold the amount of
power that Putin holds, Russians are generally content that he has remained a
central figure. Indeed, a November 2008 poll showed that Putin's popularity was
at eighty-three percent, while Medvedev's was at seventy-six percent.253 Rus-
sians are not rushing to change the status quo, they enjoy the peace and stability
that Putin's rule provides.
Moreover, the tandem relationship between Putin and Medvedev resembles
other Russian political relationships of the past. During the Soviet era, the leader
of the Soviet Union was constructively the head of state, but the individual with
actual power was the head of the Communist Party, illustrative that this "unprec-
edented" relationship may not actually be so unprecedented, 254 and instead repre-
sents the continued desire for a strong state - which Putin embodies.
Putin's assumption of power only underscores the development of Russia's
unique democracy. Specifically, Putin was constitutionally precluded from serv-
ing as president for a third consecutive term. The Russian Constitution states:
248 Adrian Blomfield, Vladimir Putin Could Reclaim Russian Presidency Within Months, TELEGRAPH.
CO.UK, Nov. 6, 2008, http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/europe/russia/3392827/Vladimir-
Putin-could-reclaim-Russian-presidency-within-months.html.
249 Id.
250 Putin Becomes Russian PM in Leadership "Tandem, " supra note 15.
251 See id.
252 Id.
253 Miriam Elder, Door Opens for Putin to Return to Kremlin; Constitutional Reform Would Allow
Ex-President to Make Dramatic Comeback, INDEPENDENT, Nov. 15, 2008, at 32.
254 See SMrrH, REFORMING, supra note 31, at 225.
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"One and the same person may not be elected President of the Russian Federa-
tion for more than two terms running. '25 5 If Putin had sought a third term, it
would have violated the Constitution and the democratic values it espouses. The
first words of the Russian Constitution are: "The Russian Federation - Russia is
a democratic federal law-bound state with a republican form of government.
256
Article 4 of the Constitution adds: "The Constitution of the Russian Federation
and federal laws shall have supremacy in the whole territory of the Russian Fed-
eration. '257 Thus, Putin could not seek a third term because the Constitution,
which necessarily constrains him, precluded him from doing so.
In light of the inherent importance of the Russian Constitution, because Rus-
sians regard Putin as symbolic of the strong state ideal, they have willingly ac-
cepted and welcomed his continued presence. Specifically, Putin has assumed an
unprecedented amount of responsibility and power as prime minister. In particu-
lar, although the Russian Constitution provides that "The President of the Rus-
sian Federation shall be the Head of State,"258 and shall "represent the Russian
Federation within the country and in international relations," 259 it was Putin, as
the Russian Prime Minister, whom the international community sought during
the August 2008 Georgian conflict. By contrast, the Russian Constitution speci-
fies that the duties of the prime minister include developing and submitting to the
State Duma a federal budget; implementing a uniform state policy in the sphere
of culture, science,, education, health social security, and ecology; administration
of federal property: and implementing civil rights and freedoms; as well as "other
powers vested in [him] by the Constitution. 260
Accordingly, by permitting this unique tandem relationship between the presi-
dent and prime minister to develop, Russians are reconciling their historic desire
to maintain a strong state system with the democratic values embodied in their
Constitution.261 This relationship is emblematic of Russia's hybrid vision of
democracy.
3. Medvedev's Call to Amend the Constitution, November 2008: Civility and
Openness
Medvedev requested that the Russian Constitution be amended in November
2008.262 Generally, there are two ways to change the Russian Constitution.
255 Konst. RF art. 81(3). It is interesting to note that there is not yet a definitive answer regarding
whether Article 81 means that the same person is precluded from holding office for more than two terms
generally, or whether the same person is only precluded from serving more than two terms consecutively,
but can later return to the presidency.
256 Id. art. 1.
257 Id. art. 4(2).
258 Id. art. 80(1).
259 Id. art. 80(4).
260 Id. art. 114(g).
261 See Ignatius, A Tsar Is Born, supra note 41 (quoting Strobe Talbott of the Brookings Institute who
suggested, "Putin has returned to the mechanism of one-man rule .... Yet, it's a new kind of state, with
elements that are contemporary and elements from the past.").
262 See Medvedev Address, supra note 4.
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"The first is the convocation of a constitutional convention to make corrections to
the main chapters of the constitution or to work out a new draft .... The second
way is to introduce a few amendments that do not contradict the basis of the
constitutional regime .... *"263 The first way is long and complex, whereas the
"only reasonable way to change the constitution in the midterm and long term is
to add amendments gradually as has been done in the United States. ' 264
Russian law provides that passage of Medvedev's bill would require a major-
ity of the State Duma to vote for its adoption.265 Indeed, when Medvedev sub-
mitted his bill, the State Duma decisively passed it by a vote of 392 to 57,266 an
example of democratic values at work. Although it may be argued that a major-
ity of those who voted for the bill's passage were members of Putin's own United
Russia political party, whereas all fifty-seven members of the minority Commu-
nist faction voted against the bill, 267 Russia's leaders abided by democratic prin-
ciples, nonetheless. Ultimately, the bill was passed by the upper house of
Russia's parliament, and on December 30, 2008, Medvedev signed a law ex-
tending the Russian presidential term from four years to six. 268
The passage of the bill illustrates several important points. First, compared to
the Soviet era, when only one political party existed, the Communist Party,269
there are now several political parties, including United Russia Party and the
Communist Party.270 However, these are not the only parties. The very exis-
tence of multiple political parties may be attributed to the 1990s when Russians
expressed a strong desire to have multiple political parties, each of which could
represent different factions or demographics within Russia. The very existence
of multiple political parties is itself indicative of democratic progress.
Moreover, although laws were allegedly unanimously passed during the Soviet
era, this was because no opposition was permitted 271 and vocal and public dissent
was prohibited. The passage of Medvedev's bill illustrates how vocal and public
dissent is clearly permitted now. Specifically, the Communist faction responded
to the bill's passage with disgruntled comments. Communist Party and State
Duma member Viktor I. Ilyukhin said: "'Why do we have to do this today?'....
263 Viktor Sheinis, The Constitution, in BETWEEN DICTATORSHIP AND DEMOCRACY: RUSSIAN POST-
COMMUNIST POLrTCAL REFORM 56, 81 (Michal McFaul et al. eds., Carnegie Endowment for Int'l Peace
2004).
264 Id. at 82.
265 Konst. RF art. 105 ("Federal laws are passed by the House of Representatives [State Duma].
Federal laws are passed by a majority of votes of all deputies of the House of Representatives [State
Duma] ....").
266 Matthew Chance & Max Tkachenko, Russian Parliament Approves Extension of Presidential
Term, CNN.CoM, Nov. 12, 2008, http://www.cnn.com/2008/WORLD/europe/llll2/russia.president/
index.html.
267 Id.
268 Id.
269 See SMITH, REFORMING, supra note 31, at 193.
270 Id. at 215.
271 See generally Handelman, supra note 167, at 88-91 (explaining that the transition to democracy
was difficult because of the Soviet government's corruption and criminality, which caused public
distrust).
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'Why are we in such a hurry? A strict authoritarian regime has already been
established in this country. There is already unprecedented concentration of
power in one person's hands.' "272
Not to be outdone, the Communist Party's President, Gennadi A. Zyuganov
"scoffed at the idea that four years was a short period .... ,,273 Zyuganov stated:
"Soviet five-year plans had produced the Magnitogorsk and Kuznetsky metallur-
gical plants, the Gorky automotive factory and the Stalingrad tractor factory. 274
Finally, several other Communist Party members sarcastically questioned
Medvedev's intelligence. In any event, it is unimaginable that this type of dis-
sent would have been permitted, let alone made public, during the Soviet era.
Thus, although Medvedev's bill may represent a greater consolidation of power
in the presidency, it was democratically passed by the State Duma in an atmos-
phere of openness and where dissent was permitted. Indeed, this amendment to
the Russian Constitution illustrates Russia's vision of both a strong state and
democratic values.
C. Will Russia's Hybrid Vision of Democracy Endure?
Putin has effectively restored Russia to a familiar style of government by con-
solidating power in the presidential branch. Certainly, Russia has historically
been ruled with an authoritarian, if not arbitrary, fist,275 a fact that Putin
recognizes:
"Russia will not soon become, if ever, a carbon copy of, say, the U.S. or
England, where liberal values have keep historical traditions. Among us,
the state, its institutions and structures, have always played an exception-
ally important role in the life of the country and the people. For Russians,
a strong state is not an anomaly, not something that must be fought
against, but, on the contrary, the source and guarantor of order, the initia-
tor and the main driving force of all change. 27 6
In 2000, because Russia was at the brink of third-world status, Putin suggested
that Russia needed a strong state power277 because a Western-style democracy
was seemingly not fit for it. In effect, Russia's history and worldview necessi-
tated something better tailored to its needs.
Consequently, because a strong state represents a return to that which Russians
are comfortable with, if not well-suited for, it is not surprising that a Russian-
style democracy would ultimately incorporate strong state elements. Perhaps
Russians still desire a tsar-like ruler. Indeed, Russians have even referred to
272 Ellen Barry, Russia Moves Closer to Extending the Presidential Term, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 15, 2008,
at A8.
273 Id.
274 Id.
275 See KURKCH1YAN, supra note 36, at 37; see supra note 99.
276 Nikolai Sokov, Russia's New Concept of National Security, 9 E. EUR. CONST. REv. 83, 84 (2000).
277 See id.
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Putin as "the protector of the system. '278 Thus, although "Putin's treatment of
the strong-state theme differs from earlier models of state strength in Russian
thought by virtue of its insistence on law, democracy, and freedom,' '2 79 Putin has
not forgotten how central a strong state remains.
Putin has also indicated that a consolidation of power in Russia is necessary to
ensure a more stable development of the law. As Russia proceeds through this
transitional period, Putin has indicated that any divergence from "democracy"
may be necessary because Russia is not yet ready for a totally democratic sys-
tem.280 Although this type of statement does not comport with certain of Putin's
other statements, it suggests that Russia has never been, nor will it ever be able to
adopt the type of democracy of America or Britain - and consequently, that it is
futile to assess Russian democracy from a western-democratic perspective.2 8'
Accordingly, it remains unclear whether Russia is necessarily capable of devel-
oping the type of democracy found in the U.S. or Britain, or if it is simply begin-
ning the process, such that comparisons are futile.
In any event, a strong Russian state is not necessarily an anomaly, or sugges-
tive of a burgeoning authoritarian state. Rather, a strong-state Russia simply sug-
gests that Russia is nurturing its own distinct hybrid-style of democracy.2 82
Ultimately, because Russia is actively working to develop democracy on its own
and on its own terms, this hybrid-style of democracy is likely to endure.
IV. Conclusion
"What matters above all is not whether a law is bad or good. What matters is
whether or not the law exists. A bad law is nevertheless a law. Good illegality is
nevertheless illegal. 2 83
If you believe the American rhetoric, Russian leaders have hijacked the rule of
law and democracy that was slowly developing in Russia. However, as this Arti-
cle explains, Russian reality is quite different. Current Russian leaders have ac-
tually strengthened, not abandoned, legal and democratic reform.
This Article has offered a new, more nuanced approach. It has reexamined
Russian legal and political developments through a Russian, rather than an Amer-
ican-centric lens - through the Russian looking glass. This Russian lens has
revealed a vision of law and democracy that is uniquely Russian, a hybrid-style
278 Yuri Zarakhovich, The New (Old) Russian Imperialism, TIME, Aug. 27,. 2008, available at http:I/
www.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,1836234,00.html.
279 Remington, supra note 170, at 65.
280 It is worth noting that this is inconsistent with the author's argument that Russia may not even be a
good candidate for western-style democracy. However, it is feasible that Putin would make such state-
ments to suggest that a western-style democracy remains the goal, even if it is not.
281 See Eric Kraus et al., Russia Profile Weekly Experts Panel: An Investment of Diminishing Re-
turns?, RussIA PROFILE.ORG, Mar. 14, 2008, available at http:H/www.russiaprofile.orglpage.php?page
id=Experts%27+Panel&articleid=a1205517754 , (arguing that the "West is far too smugly secure in its
sense of inherent political superiority to consider alternative versions of 'democracy.'").
282 See Remington, supra note 170, at 68.
283 ALEXANDER ZINOVIEV, Tim YAWNING HEIGHTS 306-07 (Random House 1979).
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scheme that seeks to incorporate Russian values, as well as the Russian
experience.
Russia faces great challenges. The process of creating a new legal and demo-
cratic culture will be long, arduous and, at times, stagnant or ineffective. 284
However, if Russia continues to nurture its unique vision of the law through its
hybrid-style rule of law and democracy, it will meet these challenges. In the
process, it has already introduced a new generation to a distinctively Russian
vision of the law and democracy - consistent with Russia's own heritage and
values. What is most impressive about Russia's newfound vision of the law is
that it seeks to incorporate Russian values that comport with the Russian experi-
ence.285 Indeed, for all of the criticism against Putin, he has nonetheless reinter-
preted the Russian tradition of being a world leader and power "in a pragmatic
and modernizing spirit .... 286
The next step for U.S. policymakers, scholars, and citizens is to abandon their
American-centric view of Russia and recognize the reality of Russian law and
democracy today. With a new U.S. administration, it is time to reconsider the
prevailing American-centric view.2 87 Through a Russian lens, they will see Rus-
sia's current reform program for what it is - progress rather than retreat.
284 See SMiTH, REFORMiNG, supra note 31, at 237 (stating that "[d]uring this transition phase the laws
themselves and their enforcement may be less than perfect, but what is important is that they are func-
tioning, however imperfectly. Laws matter.").
285 An issue beyond the scope of this Article, but worth noting is that Russia's burgeoning legal
culture may soon become a source of Russian national pride, in the same way Russians are proud of their
ballet or technological developments. Indeed, the development of its hybrid vision of the law may ulti-
mately be a great success and thusly, a source of national pride.
286 Remington, supra note 170, at 69.
287 See Struck, supra note 30.
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